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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Overview
of IO Watch Archive Quotes II 1995-2004 75.
"Senior U.N. officials have been corrupted: not by power and
ambition but by their tax-free salaries and their comfortable lives. Servants and secretaries help them
get through the day and perform their non-existent jobs. All they want is for this to
continue until they retire
" Tom Bethell, National
Review (US), August 28, 1995.
76.
"When it comes to organization and supervision, [43 percent of UN
staff responding] consider
that their supervisor's performance is inadequate
or downright bad. Professional staff are the most concerned.
On the whole, staff members want better -- i.e., qualified -- managers,
more accountability within the Organization and more personal initiative
and responsibility." "Picture of UN staff: A
worldwide survey: Organized by UN staff for UN staff", Geneva, 25 September 1995, pp. 3, 5, 10, 13-14.
77. "
Efforts must be made
to do away with the widespread tendency of staff, even in key positions, to shun
responsibility and accountability.
OIOS backs measures taken by the Department of Administration and
Management to achieve this goal and will focus its own recommendations to
management accordingly.
Many UN managers are not used to and
seem to be quite reluctant to accept criticism, particularly when it comes
to applying accountability criteria rather than
settling for the promise that some specific problems won't recur. This feature of the United Nations
culture must be changed if we are ever to develop staff awareness
and acceptance of responsibility and accountability. United Nations managers must stop
being defensive and enter into a critical dialogue with OIOS."
"Report of
the Secretary-General on the activities of the [OIOS]", UN document A/50/459, 2 October 1995,
in "Preface", by the first head ot the OIOS, Mr. Karl Paschke.
78.
"For years Western
governments have complained about the lack of
accountability prevailing in UN organizations, but in practice they have tolerated a
degree of opacity that would be considered totally unacceptable for any
civil service in a democracy.
[No] amount of exhortation as the
years have proved can compensate for the lack of routine inspection
under established rules of open government. Evaluation would require
built-in procedures requiring the UN bureaucracies to respond to
criticisms. So ingrained is the collusion between the permanent
representatives to these organizations and the secretariats
that a majority for such an initiative among the UN membership would be
difficult though not impossible to muster. But many UN staff members would
welcome more rigorous scrutiny
Rosemary Righter, Utopia
lost: The United Nations and world order, Twentieth Century Fund, New
York, 1995, pp. 280-281. [emphasis
added]
79.
"'United Nations management' has been termed an oxymoron, a
juxtaposition of incompatibles.
Over the past fifty years, there
have been various attempts to strengthen United Nations programmes and
improve their management, but they have not been well
implemented. The General
Assembly insisted very forcefully in December 1993 that a new, 'transparent and effective system
of accountability and responsibility' be established
The future status and credibility of the United Nations require
it to demonstrate that it is a learning organization which will skillfully
and flexibly manage its limited resources to produce results
The current
effort is undoubtedly the best, and possibly the last, opportunity to
establish a strong management culture and performance emphasis in the
United Nations.
At the
same time, this enormous process of change is being done with modest
resources, against entrenched habits of
mediocre management, and in the midst of continuing
operational and financial turbulence
" Joint Inspection
Unit, "Management in the United
Nations: Work in progress",
UN document A/50/507,
1995, "Executive
Summary", p. v. [emphasis
added] 80.
"The [Integrated Management Information System (IMIS), approved by
the General Assembly in 1988,] moved forward with painful slowness
for years, due primarily to management indecision and a lack of proper
support to the contractor (resulting in significant cost overruns and an
expected final total cost of some $76 million
Meanwhile, the antiquated
existing systems have continued to provide inaccurate, tardy,
inconsistent, and inadequate financial and personnel data, which could
rarely be used by managers in daily operations. Recently, however, with
stronger leadership and following a 'complete reprogramming and
rebudgeting exercise' and a review by the Board of Auditors, IMIS may now
be ready to reach a 'critical mass' of implementation
"
"Management in the United
Nations: Work in progress", Joint Inspection Unit, UN document A/50/507,1995, para.
54.
81.
Randolph Kent's study of international disaster
relief is a considered, compassionate, and pessimistic assessment of the
whole sorry history of ad hoc expedients and what he politely calls
'institutional insecurities.' He points out that it took the Nigerian
civil war (which claimed, without UN intervention as peacekeeper, perhaps
a million casualties
), the Peruvian earthquake, and the combination of
war with natural disaster in Bangladesh -- all of which occurred between
1967 and 1971 -- 'to bring the simmering issues of the United Nations'
role in emergency operations to the boil.' Unproductively on the boil it has
remained.
Since 1971, no fewer than ten UN disaster units have been created,
each exerting its claim to be treated as contact point, fund-raiser,
coordinator, and assessor, each with a mandate in excess of its
capacities.
Alongside these are at least a dozen national disaster units, and
an increasingly sophisticated, relatively well coordinated and flexibly
managed assortment of voluntary organizations." Rosemary Righter,
Utopia lost: The United Nations and world
order, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1995, p. 290. [Note: The quote is from Randolph C. Kent, Anatomy of disaster relief: The international network
in action, Frances Pinter, London, 1987.
82.
Introduction: A good idea fallen among thieves The UN has the
media relations of a 1950s state bureaucracy. It
doesn't
like reporters looking into its inner workings, and it threatens
dire penalties to staff found leaking information to the media. Time and time again, when journalists have exposed
scandals in the UN, senior officials set up an enquiry -- into who
leaked!" Ian Williams, The UN for beginners, Writers and Readers
Publishing, New York, 1995, p. 1. 83.
"With a budgeting process as antiquated and arcane as
the UN's, the dearth of training -- the key to instituting a truly
cost-effective management culture -- is shocking. Managers
often start out with no notion of how to administer their own office
budgets.
"Management training', confined mostly to the UN's Performance
Appraisal System, still takes a back seat to language-training programmes
which dominate staff improvement time. Managerial expertise is but a faint
consideration in the promotion of managers at any level, including the
Secretary-General." Morris B. Abram, "Save
the UN", The Geneva Post, No. 9, May 17-22, 1996.
84.
"Halfway through his term and answerable only to Member States,
[Mr. Karl Paschke, the UN's first "Inspector General"] can look forward to
a comfortable couple of years
But United Nations observers are beginning
to ask what has been achieved in exchange for
a free hand for
Paschke.
The answer is not encouraging.
the original conception of Paschke's
post was a combination of Grand Inquisitor and Super Sleuth. The final
product, insiders say, falls far short of either.
"The problem is that half the OIOS
staff do not know anything about the UN" we are told, "and the other half
know everything there is to know but are part of the establishment and
they are not going to make waves." The results of OIOS's travails are
paltry indeed
. There are whispers that senior staff need not fear
their peccadilloes will be exposed. Paschke's Finest, it is said, will
rake no muck above a certain level of political or bureaucratic
influence."
"Diplomatic pouch", Diplomatic World Bulletin, July 29-August 6, 1996, p. 10.
85.
"The image of the UN is disastrously bad not only for the public at
large, but even among diplomats or delegates to the U.N. who are in
constant touch with the Secretariat members. It is
extremely bad among the few reasonable and honest 'senior U.N. officers'
who remain in the service of the Organization. One of them
told Maggie O'Kane, the well-known investigative reporter (who has also
won the 'Journalist of the Year' award) that, 'This is the most corrupt
organization I have ever worked for; everybody is on the take.'" Houshang
Ameri, Politics of staffing
the United Nations Secretariat, Major Concepts in
Politics and Political Theory, Vol. 8, Peter Lang, New York, 1996, p. 399. The concluding quote is from The Guardian (UK), August 26 1993.
86. "In
1996,
Andre Sirois, a legal translator at the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, found himself surrounded by rampant kickbacks, bribes, and
mismanagement.
He reported it all to
[the OIOS. Its] representatives
came out to investigate, and Sirois encouraged his colleagues to speak
with them.
In short order, he and the other complainers were effectively fired
despite good performance reviews and a shortage of qualified staff
. When the firings
began, Sirois and two colleagues flew secretly to New York City
[at
their own expense, but no senior UN officials] would listen to them. Eventually,
the OIOS substantiated the corruption at the ICTR and the entire senior
administrative staff was fired, but it was too late for the
whistle-blowers -- their job contracts had expired. Sirois
appealed the nonrenewal of his contract, and seven years later, he
won. But
there was a catch:
his contract carried no expectation of renewal." Corine Hegland, "Whistle-blowing at the United Nations", National Journal (US), March 12, 2005.
87.
"Real reform requires an ongoing search for excellence
above all,
in the performance of our staff. In this I [new
Secretary-General Kofi Annan] will not compromise. I expect from
each and every staff member, at all levels, a total commitment to
excellence. I expect the Secretariat to work
together and at all times to function properly.
I pledge to you today that we will develop a new
management culture in the Organization. Our senior managers across the world
must understand their obligation to properly manage the staff -- the
human resources -- entrusted to their care. It is my
intention to
hold my managers accountable for providing the full range of
career support to their staff in their day-to-day work.
We are the United Nations, and we believe our
organization can fulfil the vision of our Charter
The excellence of our performance will turn our
detractors into supporters. We all know [that]
nobody argues with
success." "Secretary-General
urges staff to strive for excellence, stressing UN performance will turn
detractors into supporters", SG/SM/6140 of 9
January 1997, pp. 1,3, 4. [Note: See, however, the entry
below on accountability deficiencies eight years later, of 17 May 2005.]
88.
Sins of member states: Secretariat staff
resent
member state interference in
their daily work
[their
micromanagement of] the hiring and promotion of Secretariat
personnel.
. [and of] Secretariat budgeting,
. too often
seeking to control the minor details of spending allocations.
. Sins of the
Secretariat:
. Member states
contend that ineffective -- some would say nonexistent -- managerial
practices throughout the Secretariat have led to inefficient use of the
[UN resources]
; a staff unaccountable for its actions and prone to
delegate upwards;
a lack of transparency in Secretariat decision making
[on] policy issues, personnel, and budget expenditures.
much of the
information that is provided is not timely or readable.
Overall,
inefficiency and lack of accountability within the Secretariat, whether
perceived or real, have invited member state micromanagement. " "Making UN reform
work: Improving member state-Secretariat relations", Report of the
twenty-eighth United Nations issues conference, The Stanley Foundation, February 21-23, 1997, pp. 2, 14-16.
89.
"The General
Assembly
I.2. Regrets with deep concern
that further progress in the implementation of the adopted [human
resources] strategy has not been achieved
; 3.
Regrets the unsuccessful efforts to develop a
management environment and culture in the Organization
II.
Reaffirming its resolution 48/218A of
[1993], in particular
...
ensuring that programme managers are accountable for the effective
management of human resources allocated to them,
2.
Requests the
Secretary-General to
[impose] sanctions in
cases of demonstrated mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or
disregard for established rules and procedures
3.
to issue specific administrative instructions
[including] sanctions
for any financial loss suffered by the
United Nations as a result of gross negligence
; 4.
Deplores the high number of exceptions to the
established procedures for
[human resource decisions], in particular in
the [personnel office, OHRM]; 6.
Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to streamline
[administration]
through delegation of authority to programme managers
and to ensure, before
delegating such authority, that
well-designed mechanisms of accountability, including the necessary
internal monitoring and control procedures
, are put in
place
" "Human resources
management", General Assembly resolution 51/226 of 25 April 1997, Part I, paras. 2-4, Part II, first
preambular and paras. and 2-4, and 6. [emphasis added] 90.
"The General
Assembly,
Expressing deep
concern about the persistence of problems and defects observed by the
Board of Auditors in the financial administration and management of the
United Nations;
11. Notes
with deep concern the incidents of fraud and presumed fraud
reported by the Board of Auditors; 12. Requests the Secretary-General and the executive heads
to take the disciplinary
actions necessary in cases of proven fraud and to enhance the individual
accountability of United Nations personnel, including through stronger managerial
control;
" "Financial reports and
audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors,"
General Assembly resolution 51/225 of 16 May
1997.
[emphasis added] 91.
"UN employees -- who request anonymity because they fear they will
suffer more professional harm than the corrupt officials they want to
expose -- have provided numerous accounts of officials' being transferred
rather than dismissed after being caught breaking the rules. This happens frequently in cases of sexual
harassment, nepotism, and occasionally violence, according to these
accounts. Whistle-blowers are neither encouraged nor
rewarded." Barbara Crossette, "In war on corruption and waste,
UN confronts well-entrenched foe", International
Herald Tribune, 3 November 1997.
92.
"OHRM will convene
a task force of experts [to make
a] 'clear delineation of responsibilities' [which] is expected to lead to
a reduction in micro-management. [The IDR then notes that]
Micromanagement by intergovernmental bodies is an
index of the lack of trust between the majority of delegations and the UN
Secretariat.
[If this trend is to be reversed] there must be a much
clearer conceptualization of change, a balanced explanation of
implications, and an absolute sincerity of purpose. The current
perception of the Secretariat among many delegations is that in terms of
personnel policy it is confused, does not understand the full implications
of what is proposed, and has a hidden agenda.
In
pushing for reorientation, Ms. Salim speaks some home truths
'there is
'widespread staff distrust of management' and the UN's 'organizational
culture is one in which advancement is generally expected on the basis of
longevity rather than performance.'" "UN personnel chief
reviewing all aspects of management in bid to simplify controls, delegate
authority,", International Documents Review,
16 February 1998, p. 2. 93. "In
a rather scathing [1998] report, the General Assembly's Advisory Committee
on Administrative and Financial Questions (ACABQ) has dismissed the
'concept paper'
submitted by the Secretariat on 'Reducing and refocusing
of non-programme costs.'
Rather than call
for yet another report, the ACABQ suggests that a practical move at this
stage might be to 'set aside a preoccupation with concept and theory
to
concentrate on
specific new measures to increase the efficiency and
confirm the results arising out of the implementation of new measures as
well as those initiated prior to the current exercise." "Advisory Committee
rejects "non-programme costs" report", International Documents Review, 16 March 1998, page 5. 94.
"The job of secretary-general at the United Nations is not unlike
that of a medieval pope.
Until recently
[Kofi Annan]
seemed to have momentum on his side. But his
successful diplomatic crusade in Iraq
[is] unraveling
the UN's
monitors have been hustled out of Congo
the hard-won peace in Angola is
at vanishing point
[and] the
[UNHCR] faces unexpected allegations of
corruption.
Sooner or later
the UN will have to change
into the 'narrower and deeper' organization
reformers have always wished it would be. Mr. Annan is
nervous about the idea of a much narrower UN
[Yet]
the failure
by most popes to face up to the abuses within their own organizations
opened up the way to reformation of a more devastating type. Or as one
insider puts it: "If the UN's friends do not reform it, its enemies
will.'" "Reforming the United
Nations: Pope Kofi's unruly flock", The
Economist, August 8th, 1998, pp. 17-19.
95. "
The [1998 OIOS
annual] report is a guide to a variety of UN scandals
"The Second UN Conference on Human Settlements
is perhaps the crown jewel
[with]
an uncovered
deficit in the range of $2 million
The Conference 'never submitted a cost plan for the
use of the $8.2 million in voluntary contributions
and accounting for donor contributions was
incomplete. [OIOS does not address the question of how this
situation developed and was allowed to continue.]
"OIOS has investigated
an UNCTAD
staff member
who bilked the agency of over $600,000
by claiming travel and per diem expenses for non-existent experts
attending imaginary meetings. [OIOS does not
mention] that this imaginative individual was
caught only because he was hospitalized for a time and could not keep up
the charade.
This is surely material for a Hollywood comedy.]" "Reviewing 3+ years of work, [OIOS] sees continuing
problems - but reforms are afoot," International
Documents Review, 2 November 1998, pp.
1-4.
96. "The General Assembly
IV.
Delegation of authority and accountability
3.
notes that no comprehensive system of accountability and
responsibility has been established;
10.
Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General [of
25 April 1997] to enhance managerial
accountability with respect to human resources management
decisions, including imposing sanctions in case of demonstrated
mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or disregard for established
rules and procedures, while safeguarding the right of due
process of all staff members, including managers." "Human resources management," General Assembly resolution 53/221 of 23 April 1999. [emphasis added]
97.
"The United Nations of today
is a better Organization in many
respects than, say, five years ago, and enhanced oversight has played its
part in that change. However, further
improvement within the United Nations is still necessary in many
ways.
Internal controls are not strong enough yet; accountability
continues to be blurred and misunderstood; delegation of authority must be
effectively executed; and human resources management is in need of further
reform, particularly in
the system of personnel assessment.
The
operational and psychological distance between Headquarters and the field,
that is, the other duty stations
remains a problem." Karl T. Paschke,
Under-Secretary-General and first head of the OIOS, in "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services" A/54/393 of 23 September 1999,
Preface.
98. "It
is not easy to admit the truth of Srebrenica, the Bosnian town where [in
1995] thousands of Muslim men were executed and hundreds buried alive
But in
its report on Monday, the United Nations accepts its share of the blame.
.
. In the recent
case of East Timor, the council supported the idea of a UN referendum on
independence but refused to send troops to deter a bloodbath that was
widely predicted. Sometimes the
United Nations' failure is built into its structure. Where a
permanent member of the Security Council opposes intervention, no action
will be authorized
But in cases where the Security Council does approve
action, it is fair to insist that it be serious. The UN member
states need to embrace force to secure peace; they need to shove
neutrality aside and denounce evil in order to combat it.
." "The UN apologizes", The Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, November 19, 1999.
99.
"After the humiliating failures of United Nations
peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Rwanda there was a consensus
. that new ways of undertaking them [needed urgently
to be] developed. That is what makes the recent decision
to deploy 5,500 U.N. peacekeepers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
so incomprehensible.
. As the United Nations itself now concedes, [the
efforts] in Rwanda and Bosnia
never had either the means or the mandate to
accomplish anything more than a bit of marginal humanitarian relief. [Yet in] the
proposed Congo deployment
. the identical mistakes are being made once
again.
The fact that they are being made with the best of intentions
alters nothing
Instead, it will seem as if the world tried to do
something for Africa, but nothing could be done. Such a
conclusion helps nobody, least of all those Africans who deserve so much
better from the rest of the world." David Rieff, "Making
the same mistakes: Memo to the United Nations: A peacekeeping mission to
Congo may do more harm than good", Newsweek, March 20,
2000.
100. "In recent
years, the United Nations has had fundamental problems. In 1994, the
U.N.'s inability to procure goods and services fairly and on time reached
a crisis.
Also there was an overall failure of its human resources system to
staff critical posts with the right people. Peacekeeping missions in Somalia,
Rwanda, and Bosnia failed to accomplish their mission. "[In 1997] The
Secretary General proposed a reform program
[and] set the end of 1999 as
the target to put the reforms in place.
The United Nations
has not yet implemented reforms to focus its programming and budgeting
on managing the Secretariat's performance. These initiatives
would enable Member States to hold the Secretariat accountable for
results and are key to the success of the overall reform
The U.N.
reform is an interrelated process and requires that all core elements be
in place to succeed." US General Accounting Office, "United Nations: Reforms are progressing, but overall objectives have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-169, May 10, 2000, pp. 2-3, and "United Nations: Reform initiatives have strengthened operations, but overall objectives have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-150, May 2000.
101. "After the
.
chaos in Sierra Leone, [many people have urged changes in UN The UN is always
short of the personnel it needs for peacekeeping operations.
First World countries with first-rate armies are usually
unwilling to put their troops at risk. Thus, When
peacekeepers perform badly, it is too politically embarrassing to remove
them.
This is particularly true of senior officials since they were often
given their jobs not because of their ability but because of the
country they represent. For instance, as the situation in
Sierra Dennis C. Jett, "The UN's peacekeeping failures are built in and intractable", International Herald Tribune, May 23, 2000. [Note: Mr. Jett is the author of Why peacekeeping fails, St. Martins, New York, 2000.] 102. "While there is currently a comprehensive system of [UN internal] justice in
place, its highly formalized nature leads to protracted and lengthy proceedings that are
in the interest of neither justice nor of the staff or
management. At present, the decision makers whose
administrative decisions are questioned are very rarely directly involved
in defending the cases. This has resulted in the
perception that the system shields managers from being held accountable
for their decisions." "Human resources management reform: Report of the
Secretary-General," UN document A/55/253 of 1
August 2000, para. 51. [emphasis added] 103. "The jurisdictional immunity of the [United Nations]
legally obligates it to have just and effective internal
processes to deal with grievances and appeals by staff,
and with disciplinary cases
[as] an indispensable
aid to maintaining staff morale, as well as enforcing
accountability."
"Accountability and
responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/270 of 3 August 2000, Summary, para. 39.
[emphasis added]
104. "The present
report
presents the elements of an integrated and
effective system of accountability. It outlines the progress made
and
outlines changes
which will allow for the effective
implementation of the comprehensive system of accountability now
established.
In conclusion, the Secretary-General is
confident that
the comprehensive system
now in place ensures that
accountability mechanisms are effectively used, are
seen to be used, and ensure that staff at all levels are held accountable
for their actions and inaction." The General
Assembly may wish to take note of the mechanisms
which together
constitute the comprehensive system of accountability for the
Organization." "Accountability and responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/55/270 of 3 August 2000, Summary, paras. 1-2, 47-48.
105.
"Challenges to implementation
No amount of
money or resources can substitute for the significant changes that are
urgently needed in the culture of the Organization.
People
everywhere are fully entitled to consider that [the United Nations] is their organization, and as such to pass judgement
on its activities and the people who serve in it. Furthermore, wide
disparities in staff quality exist and those in the system are the first
to acknowledge it; better performers are given unreasonable workloads to
compensate for those who are less capable. Unless the United Nations
takes steps to become a true meritocracy, it will not be able to reverse
the alarming trend of qualified personnel, the young among them in
particular, leaving the Organization. Unless
the Secretary-General and
his senior staff
seriously address this problem on a priority basis,
reward excellence and remove incompetence, additional resources will be
wasted and lasting reform will become impossible." Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations [the "Brahimi report"], UN document A/55/305 -- S/2000/809 of
August 21 2000, p. xiv. [emphasis
added] 106. "The United Nations has been hit by an unprecedented
wave of fraud, waste and corruption. Officials at its antifraud
investigation unit say they are expecting to have to run more than 350
inquiries by the end of the year. Thousands of staff, contractors, and
consultants have been interviewed in scores of countries.
The revelations
will embarrass Kofi Annan
[ahead of]
the 'Millenium Summit' in New York
[where he hopes] to convince skeptical heads of state
that the UN has provided value for money and that its role should be
expanded.
One senior
investigator said last week that the UN investigations unit's workload was
greater than ever. "We are seeing more and more frauds and abuses of
authority.
The OIOS's annual
report, due out next month, will reveal cases of sloppy management, lax
enforcement, harassment and outright criminality.
OIOS is working with
dozens of international police forces -- including Scotland Yard -- on
inquiries into the activities of UN personnel." Jason Burke, et.
al., "UN rocked by flood of fraud cases: Officials were 'addicted to
luxury",
The Observer International (UK), September 3, 2000. [Note: no similar
report on UN corruption has been issued before or since.]
107. "A former
[senior UN human rights official]
told The Observer
that the UN has 'an absurd and unaccountable system of abuse, embezzlement
and ineptitude.' [He said] 'It's
very difficult to dig out and punish abuse in an organization where it is
the norm.
[He]
described a
series of cases that included: assistants to a senior official based in
another country not realizing for more than a year that their superior had
died; [and] an official report on the human rights situation in
Czechoslovakia, written by an overworked official by 'cutting and pasting'
a report from Columbia.
The words 'Czech Republic' had just been pasted
in,' he] said. He also criticized
'an addiction to perks and luxury.' When one UN official in Rwanda had
wanted to interview the Canadian general [who had been] in charge of
peacekeeping forces there he had been told to arrange an itinerary with
stays on the way out and back in Brussels, Paris and Geneva, [he] claimed." Jason Burke, et.
al., "UN rocked by flood of fraud cases: Officials were 'addicted to
luxury," The Observer International (UK), September 3, 2000.
108. "The UN Sexual
Harassment Policy, although in some respects reading well on the surface,
is deficient when measured against standards presently applicable
under
host country [US] law.
The UN Policy is
remarkable for its complete failure to mention retaliation. In addition,
it [seems to involve]
disciplinary procedures which are confusing,
cumbersome, bureaucratic and painfully slow. .
We believe
that the [UN
policy] would not meet [US] current standards for an effective anti-sexual
harassment policy.
the 'four P's' are either not sufficiently present or
are lacking entirely, i.e., Policy in writing, Prompt investigation,
Protection of the victim, Punishment of the harasser." "Report commenting
on United Nations sexual harassment policy", Chadbourne & Park LLP,
New York, March 2001. [Note:
to be found at
www.un.org/staff/panelofcounsel/shrep.htm .]
109. "How do you ensure that DPI [the UN Department of
Public Information] isn't seen as a propaganda tool, yet that it serves
the UN's objectives? By telling the
truth!
Information isn't propaganda unless you doctor it to distort
reality or hide inconvenient facts. We don't do that. I think you'll
admit that under Secretary General Kofi Annan we have the most transparent
United Nations imaginable
" Pranay Gupte, "Q & A: Shashi Tharoor: 'Why information matters at the UN'," Earth Times, May 2001, p. 16. 110. "In the five
years since international police officers were sent to Bosnia to help
restore law and order, the United Nations police mission there has faced
numerous charges of misconduct, corruption and sexual impropriety. But in virtually
every case, the allegations have been hushed up
often without full
investigations, according to internal UN reports and interviews
International police officers have diplomatic
immunity from prosecution in Bosnia,
and unless their governments waive that immunity, the most severe
punishment the United Nations can impose on renegade officers is to send
them home. 'The top ten percent of the American contingent were
fantastic' said a former [officer]. 'But the bottom 10 percent made your
eyes water.'" Colum Lynch, "UN police
in Bosnia: Who's watching: Allegations of abuse by international officers
are said to be hushed up", International Herald
Tribune, May 30, 2001.
111. "Kofi Annan's election to a second and last term
should normally allow him to help establish the United Nations as the
centerpiece of an emerging system of global management that is efficient,
just and accepted as legitimate by all peoples and nations. Decisive action
should not continue to be postponed in regaining the motivation and
professional quality of the United Nations in its early
years.". Enrique ter Horst,
"A re-elected secretary-general can give the world the facts",
International Herald Tribune, July 6, 2001 .
112. "Pino Arlacchi,
head of the [UN crime programme] has been told to step down. Kofi Annan
told Mr. Arlacchi that he must leave
when his contract finishes at the end of February
[i.e. in 2002]. The move follows months of controversy
Several European donors, including the Netherlands,
cut off their funding of the [Office] following allegations of Mr.
Arlacchi's mismanagement [in a]
damning UN investigation released last
month.
Mr. Annan is said to have been studying a second
report concerning more serious allegations of misconduct by Mr. Arlacchi
Diplomats who have seen the report say that it is even more damning than
the first."
[Mr. Annan's spokesman] said: We know [he] is
studying the reports and I've not been informed that he's yet made a final
decision.'" Carola Hoyos, "Annan orders head of UN drugs agency
to step down", Financial Times (UK), July 25, 2001.
113. "The [UNHCR]
has sent a team of investigators into refugee camps in west Africa
following [a report by the UNHCR and the British-based charity Save the
Children]
that large numbers of children have been sexually exploited by aid
workers there.
An unspecified
number of interviewees complained that they or their children had to have
sex in order to get food and favours. Over 40 aid
agencies
--
including the UNHCR itself -- were implicated, and 67
individuals
--
mostly local staff -- [were] named by the children.
'The very people
who are meant to be providing services are the exploiters themselves' said
[an NGO country director there.]
The charity has
already sacked three employees. A [UNHCR] spokesman
said the accusations
were so far unsubstantiated. " "Child refugee sex
scandal", BBC News, 26 February, 2002. 114. "New Yorkers,
competing to lure Kofi Annan to their dinners and benefits, are making him
the most sociable, plugged-in United Nations secretary general the city
has ever known. Sometimes that
[amounts to] five nights out a week, he
says.
That is on top of all those official lunches, diplomatic receptions
and traveling: 20 countries so far this year.
One close friend
described Mr. Annan as 'the rock star of international relations.'
[He] has a striking
partner in his wife, Nane Lagergren, a lawyer and artist
"She's just
blossomed to be the first lady of the world" [said a friend.]
"I
think he believes, quite rightly,' Sir Brian [Urquhart] said, 'that the UN
needed to reach out to people beyond the diplomatic circle. All of that
diplomatic wining and dining is a relic of a completely different
time." Barbara Crossette, "Outside UN, a secretary so social", New York Times, May 30, 2002.
115. "The U.N.
report was a bombshell. In a survey [in three West African
countries last fall,]
the writers
alleged a 'chronic and entrenched
pattern' of sex abuse in [refugee] camps, adding that government and U.N.
field managers acknowledged the problem. The response of the
UN has been almost as controversial. First, officials sat on the study for
four months.
When the paper leaked to the press,
the [UN] ordered an
investigation.
But the
[head of UNHCR], Ruud Lubbers, disparaged the study,
claiming it was based on 'heresay' -- even as the U.N. investigation
secretly turned up 20 new allegations of sex abuse.
Two weeks ago, UNHCR quietly [fired] U.N. researcher Asmita Naik,
the only
[staff-member/author] of the original study. Lubbers told
Newsweek
'She will find good jobs in the
world.'
[He] said that the sexual exploitation of refugees is 'not
widespread', adding 'Other studies like this are
superfluous
We are done now.'" Miriam Mahlow,
"Investigations: UNHCR refugee abuse", Newsweek
International, June 24,
2002, p. 5.
116. "A British
tribunal has ruled that a former member of the UN police force in Bosnia
was unfairly fired
[for reporting] that colleagues
used women and
children as sex slaves in connivance with Balkan traffickers. The UN officially
has not commented on the
case in which
Kathryn Bolkovac
charged that
she was fired in 2000 for
[reporting to Dyncorp, a UN
contractor that]
UN police officers from several countries were linked
with prostitution rings.
Bolkovac was posted
to Sarajevo in 1999 to investigate sex trafficking
She
said that UN
peacekeepers stood by while girls who refused to take part in sex acts
were beaten and raped by pimps and that one police officer paid $1,000 to
a bar owner for a girl he kept captive in his apartment.
Bolkovac said she was delighted with the tribunal's
findings because it would help her gain more international exposure for
the problem posed by corrupt peacekeepers." Barry James,
"Whistleblower upheld in UN Bosnia police case: Firing of former officer
unfair, court rules," International Herald
Tribune, August 8, 2002. 117.
"Improving the quality of management was a priority of my first
term. I
have put great emphasis on establishing clear lines of responsibility and
ensuring that managers are held accountable
I am confident
that [our] new system of recruitment, by giving managers primary
responsibility for staff selection, will lead to a new level of
accountability and empowerment.
I intend to
adopt additional measures to cut unnecessary layers of bureaucracy. At present,
the
Organization recruits highly qualified individuals for management
functions -- yet its procedures do not allow them to manage a
budget, procure what they need for everyday activities or authorize travel
for their staff." "Strengthening of the
United Nations: An agenda for further change: Report of the
Secretary-General," UN document A/57/387 of 9
September 2002, paras. 188-190. [Note: In
contrast, see the entry of 17 May 2005 below.] 118. "In 2002, the
[OIOS] found that [Secretariat] program managers and department and office heads were
not complying with U.N. regulations.
Nearly half of program managers were
not regularly monitoring and evaluating program performance. In addition,
program managers were not held accountable for meeting program
objectives because U.N. regulations prevent linking program effectiveness
and impact with program managers' performance. U.N.
officials told us that a more mature program monitoring and evaluation
system is needed before program managers can be held
responsible for program performance. We found that there
were a variety of problems
Most programs do not have comprehensive
monitoring and evaluation plans
overall, evaluation findings were not
used
The Secretary-General tasked the
OIOS to develop a
strategy to systematically evaluate and monitor programme
results and to introduce information systems needed
and expects to have a
complete system by 2006." As discussed in U. S. General Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms progressing, but
comprehensive assessments needed to measure impact, GAO 04-339, February 2004,
pp.22-23.
119.
"Challenges that must be globally managed keep
popping up: genetic engineering, AIDS, and global terrorist networks. Yet the
global landscape has dramatically changed in the last 50 years, but the
institutions serving the world have not.
Two generations
of institutional contamination and tenured self-interest ensure that this
deadlock continues.
. It's time for a
small group of national leaders to take on the challenge of reforming and
rebuilding global governance
around the issue of the democratic deficit
in multilateral institutions.
. Otherwise, endless seminars and
conferences will inevitably bog down the process in the name of consensus
Similarly, [senior
national legislators] should form a democratic caucus to provide
systematic oversight of international institutions, focusing particularly
on increasing the transparency of these institutions.
. [to]
strengthen national governments in their role in holding these agencies to
account." Mike Moore,
"Multilateral meltdown", Foreign Policy, March/April 2003, p. 75. [Note:
Mr. Moore was Director General of the World Trade Organization from 1999
to 2002.]
120. "The General Assembly 4.
regrets the serious delays in
the [internal justice] appeals process, and requests the Secretary-General
to ensure
full cooperation and accountability in the internal
system of justice of
the manager whose decision has been challenged;
9. Requests the Secretary-General
to submit
alternatives on strengthening the
administration of justice [ to ensure]
transparency and
fairness in the provision of justice to staff
; 24.
Reiterates
its request to
establish a clear linkage between the
administration of justice and responsibility and
accountability [in the UN Secretariat when decisions of
the UNAT result in losses
due to management
irregularities]
; 26.
Requests the Secretary-General to expeditiously finalize and
issue an administrative instruction on
[recovery of financial losses
caused to the Organization by wrongful actions
or gross negligence of senior officials.]" "Administration of
justice in the Secretariat," General Assembly resolution 57/307 of 22 May 2003. 121. "The [UN]
Secretariat's administrative environment is not fully leveraging the
advantages of technology, nor is it applying modern process management
practices adopted by other organizations. Many of the administrative processes
are still manual, cumbersome, time-consuming, inefficient and costly to
administer.
In some cases, layers of control slow down the process without
providing any real value." "Review of duplication,
complexity, and bureaucracy in United Nations administrative processes and
procedures," UN document A/58/211 of 4 August
2003, p. 2.
122. "The United
Nations, with a $1.2 billion budget
supports more than 9,000 employees
worldwide and dozens of peacekeeping and relief missions." Felicity Barringer,
"Outlook for UN: Radical overhaul", International
Herald Tribune, September 22, 2003. [Note: In fact, this
image of a "poor little UN" repeatedly put forth by the Secretariat is
grossly understated, focusing only on "regular" staff and funds. Actually, a
concurrent annual UN status report stated that "As of 30 June 2004, the total number
of staff of the UN Secretariat and those units with special status
holding
appointments of one year of more amounted to 37,598", which inter alia excludes thousands of temporary
staff.
On the financial side, an NGO's calculations (the UN has none of
its own) show total expenditures (mostly extra-budgetary) that ranged from
about $6.4 billion up to $10.5 billion per year during the
last two decades. See "Composition of the
Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General", UN document A/59/299 of
26 August
2004, para. 11, and "Total UN system expenditures: 1986-2004", compiled by Klaus Hόfner, March 2004, Global Policy Forum [Note: available at www.globalpolicy.org/finance/tables/tabsyst.htm .]
123. "An
independent panel investigating the bombing of the United Nations
headquarters in Baghdad [on August 19th, which took 22 lives,] said today
that the UN's security systems were 'dysfunctional'
and [need] to be
reformed. What procedures
were in place
were 'sloppy' in observance, and non-compliance with
regulations was 'commonplace,' [its report observed.]
[Panel head Martti
Ahtisaari said]
"Everyone bears
responsibility: the Member States, who are asking the UN
[to act] and of
course the Secretary-General himself -- the buck stops
always with the Secretary-General.'
[It] labeled as a
major deficiency a 'lack of accountability for the decisions and positions
taken by UN managers with regard to the security of UN staff.
The United
Nations
needs a new culture of accountability in security management.'
[Mr. Ahtisaari
said]
"We need a much more professional approach, a professional staff,
and resources available
'" "Iraqi bombing panel
finds UN security systems dysfunctional, in need of reform," UN News
service, 22 October 2003.
124. "
After all these
years, the United Nations is still struggling to adjust its human
resources policies and practices to the reality that surrounds it.
To function effectively, the UN must be able to attract and retain people
with a prominent professional track record
,
and, in so doing,
demonstrate that the [UN] Charter's insistence on staff of the highest
caliber is no hollow phrase. Several [crippling] dilemmas
, however, remain
unresolved, and this organizational pathology stands in the way of the
UN's efforts to remain meaningful. [They include:] -- the
persistent gap between its perennial promises to improve human resources
management and its capacity to deliver; and -- its
obsession with cosmetic reforms, hiding the root causes of
dysfunctionality. For
most pathologies, there is a cure. For the UN, faith healing will not
suffice." Dirk Salomons, "Good
intentions to naught: The pathology of human resources management at the
United Nations," in Dennis Dijkzeul, and Yves Beigbeder, eds., Rethinking international organizations: Pathology and
promise, Berghahn, New York and Oxford, 2003, pp. 136-137.
125. "Nearly a year
after the joint report [on food for sex in West Africa] was first
released, not one of the alleged [UN] abusers
[nor any] supervisory
officials [at]
the West African camps has been held to account, either
before a national court or in an internal disciplinary proceeding.
[UN officials]
enjoy immunity from suit (criminal or civil) in national courts for acts
performed in the course of their official duties.
the
Secretary-General
is empowered to [determine if]
impugned actions fall
within the protected sphere of 'official duties.'
UNHCR [could
have] moved forcefully and swiftly against the alleged perpetrators and
negligent managers revealed in the joint report
Sadly, it did not
[and
relied instead on the OIOS conclusion] that the allegations of widespread
abuse were not confirmed
[Given the UNHCR's]
abject failure
one would
hope that sooner rather than later
[a court]
will decree the obvious -- that functional immunity was never intended to
be a shield to be used by international organizations or their officials
to avoid legal responsibility for illegal acts clearly outside the scope
of their official duties." Edward P. Flaherty,
"Who will police the caregivers?", in "Borderlines", Lawyers Without
Borders, 2003.
126. "Last year
the World Summit on Sustainable Development
resulted in the performance
by 48 states of a total of 83 treaty actions relating to 39 treaties in
the area of economic development and environmental protection.
Many States fail to sign or ratify treaties, however,
because of a simple shortage of technical expertise necessary for the
performance of treaty actions. Some also lack the expertise to enact
the necessary laws to implement the treaties that they have signed or
ratified or to train the personnel required to apply those laws. In order to
address those needs, I
[have sought to offer appropriate technical
assistance.]" "Report of the
Secretary-General on the work of the Organization," UN document A/58/1, 2003, paras. 191-192.
127.
"[In 1997 three UN staff became whistle-blowers reporting
corruption at the UN war crimes tribunal in Rwanda. They lost
their jobs, but finally, six years later, were awarded (but not necessarily paid)
damages of from $130,000 to $240,000 each.]
Sirois was
unemployed for four years as he tried to clear his name.
Lacoste left Arusha
shattered and dismayed. She claimed in her application that she
had lost four years' income. [Goddard]
said
his reputation as a chartered accountant has been damaged
because of the
unfair and untrue accusations made against him. Ironically,
he says, the only place he could get a job was back at the United Nations,
in 2003. All three of
these highly qualified people who tried to right wrongs only to lose faith
in the U.N. justice system now praise the [UNAT] for its handling of their
cases in the end. But why did it have to take so long and
at such terrible human neglect all the way to the top. And will they
ever be repaid for their losses?" Barbara Crossette,
"The cost of U.N. whistle blowing", The Atlantic Online, the U.N. Wire , Copyright, National Journal Group,
1994, February 9, 2004.
128. "The U.N.
Secretary General launched two reform agendas, in 1997 and 2002, to
address the U.N.'s core management challenges -- poor leadership of the
Secretariat, duplication among its many offices and programs, and the lack
of accountability for staff performance.
In 2000, GAO reported that the
reforms were not yet complete. What GAO found
The Secretariat
has taken positive steps to strengthen its human capital management, but
challenges
remain. Second, the U.N. has
begun to adopt results-oriented budgeting, but it
[does] not measure program impact.
The Secretariat does not conduct comprehensive
assessments of the status and impact of U.N. reforms.
the reform agendas
lack clearly stated priorities, interim goals, and target dates for
overall completion. Other challenges include resistance to
change from program managers and possible resource
constraints." U.S. General
Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms
progressing, but comprehensive assessments needed to measure impact,
GAO 04-339, February 2004, "Highlights"
page. [emphasis
added]
[Note:
Available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-339.]
129. "
Oil-for-Food is not simply a saga of one UN program gone wrong. It is also
the tale of a systematic failure on the part of what is grandly called the
international community. Oil-for-food tainted almost everything it
touched.
It was such a kaleidoscope of corruption as to defy easy summary,
let alone concentration on the main issues. But let us try.
{The UN], along
with its secrecy,
bureaucrats beholden to the favor of
the man at the top, its almost complete lack of accountability, external
oversight, or the most elementary checks and balances,
suffers from an
endemic affinity with anti-Western despots
Perhaps
the
complicity was
built in
as the UN collected the commissions [of about
$1.9 billion] and processed the funds that transformed Oil-for-Food into
the sleaziest program ever to fly the UN flag, and the single largest
[budget] item
of all nine UN agencies involved, plus the Secretariat
itself.
That, in the end, may be the dirty secret at the center of the
Oil-for-Food scandal." Claudia Rosset,
"The oil-for-food scam: What did Kofi Annan know, and when did he know
it?", Commentary, May 2004, pp. 15-22.
[emphasis added] [Note: The full article is available at www.commentarymagazine.com/SpecialArticle.asp?article=A11705017_1 .]
130. "A new survey of
[UN integrity perceptions] has found that while structures for reporting
and combating
corruption exist, most staff members are either unaware of how to
use them or afraid to do so for fear of high-level
retaliation. 'The UN has a 'phone book' of rules and regulations
which are totally useless as they are never practiced', a staff
member is quoted as saying
[Another says,] 'Senior
leaders caught in serious breaches of ethics should be punished, not
promoted as usual.'
[The study] is being made public at a time when Secretary-General Kofi
Annan has been forced by the widespread publicity [about corruption in the
Iraq oil-for-food program] to appoint a high-level panel to look into [it]
'Get rid of the old boy
network,' one staff member
[says.]
'That network is wide, tenacious and powerful.
So long as you can wind
your way into that network, you are OK.
Opposing the network is certainly the end of a UN
career.'" Warren Hoge, "Report criticizes the way UN fights
corruption", International Herald Tribune, June 16, 2004. [emphasis added]
[Note: The actual survey is "United Nations organizational
integrity survey", Final Report, prepared by Deloitte Consulting LLP, June 2004. It is available via "Search" at
www.whistleblower.org.] 131. "
the UN has [examined the]
Secretariat's
perception of its own integrity.
[The report notes that] 'Staff members feel unprotected
from reprisals for reporting violations of the codes of conduct. This is not a
perception confined to a few staff in remote locales and/or dangerous
circumstances.
Forty-six percent (46%) gave unfavourable response to this item,
while only 12% gave favourable responses.' "[The UN integrity survey] is of course just one of
the UN's various investigations into itself.
Does anyone see a problem here? The basic flaws are simple. Any time you
create a large institution, accord it great privileges of secrecy, give it
a big budget and have it run immune from any sane standard of
accountability, you are likely to get a corrupt organization.
The problem with the Secretariat isn't "tone" at the
top.
It's accountability at the top and secrecy throughout.
Someone needs to help this institution, and it's not
a consulting team hired by the same institution
For now, I'm [starting to believe] that
the only
thing worse than having the U.N. ignore a problem is to have the U.N.
investigate it." Claudia Rosett, "The problem with the Secretariat", The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2004.
132. "The United
Nation's anti-corruption department has been rocked by accusations that
the office itself is corrupt. The
head of the [OIOS]
, Dileep Nair, has been accused of promoting and
recruiting people in ways that are not consistent with U. N. rules and
regulations.
The
scrutiny
comes at a delicate time, as the UN is under intense scrutiny
for alleged abuse of the Iraqi oil-for-food program.
Nair, who is currently on sick leave from his
position, denied all the accusations to Fox News. Other allegations of impropriety include charges that
some inside the OIOS received financial kickbacks in return for promoting
people and that some people were promoted in exchange for sexual
favors. Nair, a former banker and civil servant from
Singapore, was picked by Annan in 2000." Jonathan Hunt, Watching the UN's watchdog", Fox News, June 16,
2004. [Note: Mr. Nair was subsequently
dismissed, see entry of April 4, 2005 below.] 133. "Fraud awareness, prevention plan and
policy
The United Nations has, to some extent,
an established framework on this issue.
[but lacks]
a comprehensive internal anti-fraud and
anti-corruption infrastructure,
[and] anti-corruption and anti-fraud elements in the
various rules, procedures and internal controls
A large number of United Nations system offices,
funds and programmes have: (a) No sufficient framework for prevention,
detection, resolution, and reporting; (b) No decentralized corruption and fraud
risk-assessment mechanisms and no corruption and fraud-prevention
committee;
(c) No appropriate resolution mechanisms for
reported and detected incidents and allegations of corruption and fraud
(although reliance is placed on the [OIOS] in this regard." [The Board recommended implementing a comprehensive
corruption and fraud corruption plan and committee, training sessions,
mechanisms to respond to reported corruption, and review of field
investigation processes.]" "Financial reports and audited financial statements
for the biennium ended 31 December 2003 and Report of the Board of
Auditors", Vol. I, UN document A/59/5 of 22 July
2004, p. 12, item (u), paras. 15(s), 344-346, and 349. [emphasis added] 134. "Some of the
Board's comments [cited immediately above] may give the mistaken
impression to the uninitiated reader that the potential for large-scale
fraudulent and corrupted activities is widespread. The
Administration assigns high priority to the issues of fraud and
corruption
"
"First report on the
implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors
for the
financial period ended 31 December 2003: Report of the Secretary General",
UN document A/59/318 of 1 September 2004,
paras. 124-126.
{Note: However, see item of 17 May 2005 below.] 135. "[Sergio Vieira de Mello's death a year ago in the UN
headquarters bombing in Baghdad]
along with 22 of his colleagues
stunned the
United Nations and its staff
Why
is the United Nations short on competent personnel to lead complex
peacekeeping and political missions?
The
answer is that there is a human resources crisis in the United
Nations.
An entrenched bureaucracy, fueled by counterproductive quotas,
nepotism and outlandishly generous tenure policies, impedes the rise of
talent and excellence through the ranks.
This is why Annan
was repeatedly compelled to rely on de Mello
[The UN needs outstanding staff] .. with the
requisite experience, competence, stature and charisma to manage the UN's
presence in situations where thousands if not millions of lives and
livelihoods are at stake. With the support of
the Security Council, Annan must thoroughly reshape his work force to
improve its caliber and reward talent. Only then could he be sure of a
reliable pool of crisis managers
" Ludovic Hood,
"Remembering de Mello: The UN must let talent rise", International Herald Tribune, August 13, 2004.
136. This week the
United Nations published its annual assessment of progress toward its
Millennium Development Goals - targets established in 2000 for advancing
welfare in the developing countries. The record, as you might expect, is
mixed.
It remains questionable, in fact, whether the MDG exercise, with
its unimpeachably good intentions and its proliferating bureaucratic
overhead, has done any good at all on balance.
The weakness of
the whole MDG concept is that it wills the ends without willing the means
something which the UN, perforce, has come to specialize in.
The UN seems
especially proud of the progress [toward the goal]
in which it has a
vested interest
greater global co-operation on development.
Conferences, working groups, declarations, strategies, and programmes
are multiplying fantastically. ... However, what this is actually doing
for the putative poor country beneficiaries is harder to say. Ends without means:
The United Nations has set benchmarks for progress in poor countries. Are these any
use?, The Economist, September 11th,
2004, p.
78.
137. [UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan] appealed to world leaders yesterday to rally
behind the rule of international law, warning that global standards were
being shamelessly disregarded and selectively applied.
Today the
rule of law is at risk around the world, he told the UN General Assembly
in New York. This [international] framework is riddled with gaps and
weaknesses.
It
lacks the teeth that turn a body of law into an effective legal
system.
Many feel that it is not always used fairly or effectively; those
invoking it do not always practice what they preach.
Mr. Annan warned that the systems legitimacy was at stake. Just as
within a country respect for the law depends on the sense that all have a
say in making and implementing it, so it is in our global community. All must feel that international law belongs to them,
and protects their legitimate interests. His speech reflected an organisation facing a sense
of crisis.
Mark Turner, Annan says global rule of law at risk. Financial Times (UK), September 22, 2004.
138.
Confronted with the murder of 50,000 in Sudan,
the great hum of
diplomacy signaled that the global community was whirring into action.
The multilateral
process moved along in its dignified way. The UN secretary general [prepared]
to set up a commission. Preliminary UN resolutions were passed,
and the mass murderers were told they should stop
Finally, a week ago the Security Council passed a
resolution threatening to consider sanctions against Sudan at some
point.
The resolution passed and it was a good day
Every time there is an
ongoing atrocity, we watch the world community go through
(1) shock and
concern (2) gathering resolve (3) fruitless negotiation (4) pathetic
inaction (5) shame and humiliation (6) steadfast vows to never let this
happen again.
Its a pity about the poor dead people
in Darfur.
Their numbers are still rising, at 6,000 to 10,000 a
month. David Brooks, Another
triumph for the UN, International Herald
Tribune, September 27, 2004.
139.
"Rosemarie Waters, [the UN Staff Union President], said that
in the last six years, [UN]
management had been
reforming itself and increasing managerial authority, while reducing
accountability. The Staff Union
could not support,
however, the erosion of staff rights and dissolution of oversight
mechanisms as a means of implementation
The [integrity
survey]
revealed that staff
feared reprisals for exposing breaches of
ethics, and they perceived that the disciplinary process was applied
unevenly.
Their view of integrity among senior managers was less than
positive..
The Organization had yet to establish concrete
measures for individual accountability, she continued. It was
essential that [expanded delegations of personnel authority]
be
carefully examined and, if abuses were found, such delegation should be
revoked.
The [OHRM] had informed staff representatives of its
inability to enforce accountability because they lacked central
authority. The Fifth Committee may wish to recommend that
concrete individual accountability be developed, in consultation with
staff representatives, on a priority basis." "UN staff committee
representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management
reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of 29 October 2004, pp.
2-3. 140. "James O. C.
Jonah,
[who worked at the UN for three decades]
and served as head of
personnel from 1979 through 1982,
[said that the Fifth] Committee should also have a serious look at the
results of the integrity study. Never had the staff perception of
integrity been so low.
In some respects, the reforms had weakened the
Secretariat considerably. When he served as head of personnel, his biggest
fight had been with programme managers, who were most resistant to reform
. He could not believe that such measures as giving authority to
programme managers would strengthen the international civil service. What had been
said about the lack of authority of the OHRM was true. Without a
strong personnel office, however, there would be no uniformity of rules
and fairness in the system. Governments should
not take what was happening lightly." "UN staff committee
representatives tell budget committee concerns ignored in management
reform report", Fifth Committee, Press Release GA/AB/3641 of 29 October 2004, p. 4. 141. The lawyer for
the [UN] staff member who brought sexual harassment
charges [at UNHCR]
has said that [Secretary-General Annans
admission]
of having overruled his own investigators in clearing [high commissioner for refugees Ruud]
Lubbers would spur an appeal
The [OIOS] annual
report
[issued this week restored this damning disclosure in a
last-minute restoration]
When he cleared Lubbers of the formal charges in
July, Annan
did not reveal the negative findings of his own
investigators
and said that the complaint against Lubbers could not be
sustained.
[The lawyer, Edward
Patrick] Flaherty, argued that the doctored document strengthened his
clients case
This demonstrates that there are two sets of [UN]
rules
Flaherty said. One for the protected class and one
for the rest.
Mr. Lubbers is part of the protected class. My client is
not. The appeal also cites 12 instances of Lubbers
alleged attempts to intimidate the complainant
Fiona Fleck and Warren Hoge, Appeal is expected in UN sex case: Lawyer cites Annans overruling of his own investigators, International Herald Tribune, November 1, 2004. [Note: see the followup item of February 22, 2005 below.]
142. "U. N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan said yesterday he was disappointed in his son
for accepting payments from a key contractor in the oil-for-food programme
for more than four years longer than
previously acknowledged.
[But] while the
organization scrambles to respond to oil-for-food inquiries, other
troubles are piling up at the organization's doorstep. ... The U.N.
peacekeeping program is wracked by accusations of rape, sexual harassment
and extortion by blue helmets and civilians in the U.N. mission in Congo.
International
pressure also is building on the United Nations and the Security Council
to do more to protect civilians in Darfur, Sudan.
Internally, a
[staff]
group seeks to reopen an investigation of [the head of the OIOS]
over charges of sexual harassment and favoritism
The U.N. staff
union also has criticized Mr. Annan's willingness to exonerate Deputy
Secretary-General Louise Frechette for failing to protect U.N. staff
members in Iraq
[Mr. Annan] also
threw out an internal report finding merit in a [recent] sexual harassment
complaint against
[UNHCR head] Ruud Lubbers." Betsy Pisik, "Another oil-food scandal emerges", The Washington Times, November 29, 2004. [Note: Much more information on Mr. Annan's son's activities is available at "Google search", under "Kojo Annan" .]
143.
"Imagine if U.S. troops were accused of sexually exploiting
children in impoverished nations
a U.S. Cabinet Secretary were accused
of groping a female subordinate, [but then exonerated]
by the president
. [an
agency head]
and the president's own offspring stood accused of
complicity in [a massive embezzlement racket]
[These things
happened in the UN this year.] Where's the
outrage?
Why didn't the mainstream
devote more attention to these
scandals? Far from demanding high-level resignations, they are circling
the wagons.
[Yet] all the
reformistas' efforts founder on the rocks of
apathy and inertia.
Most of the U.N.'s 191 member states
[and] 49,000
employees
have other priorities.
Leaving the U.N.
is unrealistic.
But it will never live up to the grandiose expectations of its
starry-eyed supporters, unless they get mad enough to demand real
change.
So far there's no sign of that happening." Max Boot, "Why U.N. stays mired in its defects: Start with too-friendly media, apathy and members' entrenched interests", Los Angeles Times, December 9, 2004. 144. "The United
Nations, which extols the virtues of 'good governance', is not practising
what it preaches, say [many long-time observers.]
The complaints
come amidst several recent scandals, including accusations of bribery,
nepotism, sexual harassment, and mismanagement of peacekeeping operations
overseas. 'The underlying
problem is a lack of transparency and accountability" says Hillel Neuer,
[one close observer.] ..
In 2003 the OIOS
cleared the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna of charges of
corruption and mismanagement.
[Neuer said]
'if some of the things that happen at the United Nations took place in a
big corporation, people would have been fired.' [A UN
shortcoming, Neuer added, is that the investigation results emerge very
slowly]
are mostly 'white-washed'
[and occur] only after 'a lot of
prodding from the media and NGOs.' [A reporter
recently asked UN spokesman Fred Eckhard if there is] 'a record that shows
that the United Nations, under Kofi Annan, has taken allegations of
mismanagement and misbehaviour seriously and fired people as a
result?' [Eckhard replied]
'I will certainly ask for you
" Thalif Deen,
"Corruption: U.N. failing to practice 'good governance', IPS Inter Press Service, December 9, 2004. [Note: the Vienna office
mentioned above leads the UN global anti-corruption programme, despite
having been twice accused of corruption and mismanagement, and twice
'white-washed" by the OIOS and Secretary-General Annan. See Top corruption fighter
corrupted in this archive.]
145. "Two of the
world's most impressive spin machines are locked in deadly conflict. On the one
side is [the so-called]
'vast right-wing conspiracy', a bunch of
conservative US senators and congressmen,
[plus several major media
organizations], all calling for the head of United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan. On the other side
is the huge amorphous mass of the global great and good, all clucking in
unison that Kofi Annan is the best UN secretary-general since Dag
Hammarskjold
although a list that includes Kurt Waldheim and Boutros
Boutros-Ghali is not much competition.
The international establishment
has rallied to Annan as the first African to run the world body, and as
the first secretary-general to bring forward thoughtful and even bold
plans for UN reform. Kofi Annan must
stay, they all cry, most of them thrilling to the symbolism of a clash
between President George Bush, who proudly sports a small American flag on
his lapel, and Nobel peace prize laureate Kofi Annan, whose equally
well-tailored lapel sports a discreet dove, tastefully wrought in white
enamel." Martin Walker, "Gunning
for Kofi", The Spectator (UK), December 11, 2004.
146. "Two lawyers
for U.N. whistle-blowers urged the United Nations on Wednesday to protect
staffers who want to disclose corruption at the world body, including the
oil-for-food program for Iraq. One of the lawyers
said 'five or six' U.N. employees including a high-level employee had
contacted him for advice on how to reveal evidence of wrongdoing in [that]
programme without jeopardizing their careers.
But based on his
advice, none of [them]
have gone public, he said. 'I know them.
They won't.
They are very quiet and under a lot of stress.'
While U.N. rules
call for wrongdoers to be punished, they do nothing to shield staff
members from reprisals when they come forward with evidence, [Tom] Devine
and Sirois said. 'There is
irreparable harm when freedom of speech is canceled, irreparable harm to
the institution,' Devine said. 'The message is, 'Do not say anything
to investigators.'" Irwin Arief, "Lawyers
call on U.N. to shield whistle-blowers", Reuters, December 15,
2004.
147. "The General Assembly
6. Emphasizes the importance of establishing real,
effective and efficient mechanisms for responsibility and
accountability; 7. Regrets that despite previous information provided by
the Secretary-General on the establishment of accountability
mechanisms, including the
accountability panel, such mechanisms are not in place, thereby affecting
the efficient and effective functioning of the
Organization;" "Review of the
implementation of General Assembly resolutions 48/218B and 54/244",
General Assembly resolution 59/272 of 23 December
2004. This chronology continues in Overview of
IO Watch Archive Quotes
III
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