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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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Overview
of IO Watch Archive Quotes II 1995-2004 75.
"Senior U.N. officials have been corrupted: not by power and
ambition but by their tax-free salaries and their comfortable lives. Servants and secretaries help them
get through the day and perform their non-existent jobs. All they want is for this to
continue until they retire
" Tom Bethell, National
Review (US), August 28, 1995.
76.
"When it comes to organization and supervision, [43 percent of UN
staff responding] consider
that their supervisor's performance is inadequate
or downright bad. Professional staff are the most concerned.
On the whole, staff members want better -- i.e., qualified -- managers,
more accountability within the Organization and more personal initiative
and responsibility." "Picture of UN staff: A
worldwide survey: Organized by UN staff for UN staff", Geneva, 25 September 1995, pp. 3, 5, 10, 13-14.
77. "
Efforts must be made
to do away with the widespread tendency of staff, even in key positions, to shun
responsibility and accountability.
OIOS backs measures taken by the Department of Administration and
Management to achieve this goal and will focus its own recommendations to
management accordingly.
Many UN managers are not used to and
seem to be quite reluctant to accept criticism, particularly when it comes
to applying accountability criteria rather than
settling for the promise that some specific problems won't recur. This feature of the United Nations
culture must be changed if we are ever to develop staff awareness
and acceptance of responsibility and accountability. United Nations managers must stop
being defensive and enter into a critical dialogue with OIOS."
"Report of
the Secretary-General on the activities of the [OIOS]", UN document A/50/459, 2 October 1995,
in "Preface", by the first head ot the OIOS, Mr. Karl Paschke.
78.
"For years Western
governments have complained about the lack of
accountability prevailing in UN organizations, but in practice they have tolerated a
degree of opacity that would be considered totally unacceptable for any
civil service in a democracy.
[No] amount of exhortation as the
years have proved can compensate for the lack of routine inspection
under established rules of open government. Evaluation would require
built-in procedures requiring the UN bureaucracies to respond to
criticisms. So ingrained is the collusion between the permanent
representatives to these organizations and the secretariats
that a majority for such an initiative among the UN membership would be
difficult though not impossible to muster. But many UN staff members would
welcome more rigorous scrutiny
Rosemary Righter, Utopia
lost: The United Nations and world order, Twentieth Century Fund, New
York, 1995, pp. 280-281. [emphasis
added]
79.
"'United Nations management' has been termed an oxymoron, a
juxtaposition of incompatibles.
Over the past fifty years, there
have been various attempts to strengthen United Nations programmes and
improve their management, but they have not been well
implemented. The General
Assembly insisted very forcefully in December 1993 that a new, 'transparent and effective system
of accountability and responsibility' be established
The future status and credibility of the United Nations require
it to demonstrate that it is a learning organization which will skillfully
and flexibly manage its limited resources to produce results
The current
effort is undoubtedly the best, and possibly the last, opportunity to
establish a strong management culture and performance emphasis in the
United Nations.
At the
same time, this enormous process of change is being done with modest
resources, against entrenched habits of
mediocre management, and in the midst of continuing
operational and financial turbulence
" Joint Inspection
Unit, "Management in the United
Nations: Work in progress",
UN document A/50/507,
1995, "Executive
Summary", p. v. [emphasis
added] 80.
"The [Integrated Management Information System (IMIS), approved by
the General Assembly in 1988,] moved forward with painful slowness
for years, due primarily to management indecision and a lack of proper
support to the contractor (resulting in significant cost overruns and an
expected final total cost of some $76 million
Meanwhile, the antiquated
existing systems have continued to provide inaccurate, tardy,
inconsistent, and inadequate financial and personnel data, which could
rarely be used by managers in daily operations. Recently, however, with
stronger leadership and following a 'complete reprogramming and
rebudgeting exercise' and a review by the Board of Auditors, IMIS may now
be ready to reach a 'critical mass' of implementation
"
"Management in the United
Nations: Work in progress", Joint Inspection Unit, UN document A/50/507,1995, para.
54.
81.
Randolph Kent's study of international disaster
relief is a considered, compassionate, and pessimistic assessment of the
whole sorry history of ad hoc expedients and what he politely calls
'institutional insecurities.' He points out that it took the Nigerian
civil war (which claimed, without UN intervention as peacekeeper, perhaps
a million casualties
), the Peruvian earthquake, and the combination of
war with natural disaster in Bangladesh -- all of which occurred between
1967 and 1971 -- 'to bring the simmering issues of the United Nations'
role in emergency operations to the boil.' Unproductively on the boil it has
remained.
Since 1971, no fewer than ten UN disaster units have been created,
each exerting its claim to be treated as contact point, fund-raiser,
coordinator, and assessor, each with a mandate in excess of its
capacities.
Alongside these are at least a dozen national disaster units, and
an increasingly sophisticated, relatively well coordinated and flexibly
managed assortment of voluntary organizations." Rosemary Righter,
Utopia lost: The United Nations and world
order, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1995, p. 290. [Note: The quote is from Randolph C. Kent, Anatomy of disaster relief: The international network
in action, Frances Pinter, London, 1987.
82.
Introduction: A good idea fallen among thieves The UN has the
media relations of a 1950s state bureaucracy. It
doesn't
like reporters looking into its inner workings, and it threatens
dire penalties to staff found leaking information to the media. Time and time again, when journalists have exposed
scandals in the UN, senior officials set up an enquiry -- into who
leaked!" Ian Williams, The UN for beginners, Writers and Readers
Publishing, New York, 1995, p. 1. 83.
"With a budgeting process as antiquated and arcane as
the UN's, the dearth of training -- the key to instituting a truly
cost-effective management culture -- is shocking. Managers
often start out with no notion of how to administer their own office
budgets.
"Management training', confined mostly to the UN's Performance
Appraisal System, still takes a back seat to language-training programmes
which dominate staff improvement time. Managerial expertise is but a faint
consideration in the promotion of managers at any level, including the
Secretary-General." Morris B. Abram, "Save
the UN", The Geneva Post, No. 9, May 17-22, 1996.
84.
"Halfway through his term and answerable only to Member States,
[Mr. Karl Paschke, the UN's first "Inspector General"] can look forward to
a comfortable couple of years
But United Nations observers are beginning
to ask what has been achieved in exchange for
a free hand for
Paschke.
The answer is not encouraging.
the original conception of Paschke's
post was a combination of Grand Inquisitor and Super Sleuth. The final
product, insiders say, falls far short of either.
"The problem is that half the OIOS
staff do not know anything about the UN" we are told, "and the other half
know everything there is to know but are part of the establishment and
they are not going to make waves." The results of OIOS's travails are
paltry indeed
. There are whispers that senior staff need not fear
their peccadilloes will be exposed. Paschke's Finest, it is said, will
rake no muck above a certain level of political or bureaucratic
influence."
"Diplomatic pouch", Diplomatic World Bulletin, July 29-August 6, 1996, p. 10.
85.
"The image of the UN is disastrously bad not only for the public at
large, but even among diplomats or delegates to the U.N. who are in
constant touch with the Secretariat members. It is
extremely bad among the few reasonable and honest 'senior U.N. officers'
who remain in the service of the Organization. One of them
told Maggie O'Kane, the well-known investigative reporter (who has also
won the 'Journalist of the Year' award) that, 'This is the most corrupt
organization I have ever worked for; everybody is on the take.'" Houshang
Ameri, Politics of staffing
the United Nations Secretariat, Major Concepts in
Politics and Political Theory, Vol. 8, Peter Lang, New York, 1996, p. 399. The concluding quote is from The Guardian (UK), August 26 1993.
86. "In
1996,
Andre Sirois, a legal translator at the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, found himself surrounded by rampant kickbacks, bribes, and
mismanagement.
He reported it all to
[the OIOS. Its] representatives
came out to investigate, and Sirois encouraged his colleagues to speak
with them.
In short order, he and the other complainers were effectively fired
despite good performance reviews and a shortage of qualified staff
. When the firings
began, Sirois and two colleagues flew secretly to New York City
[at
their own expense, but no senior UN officials] would listen to them. Eventually,
the OIOS substantiated the corruption at the ICTR and the entire senior
administrative staff was fired, but it was too late for the
whistle-blowers -- their job contracts had expired. Sirois
appealed the nonrenewal of his contract, and seven years later, he
won. But
there was a catch:
his contract carried no expectation of renewal." Corine Hegland, "Whistle-blowing at the United Nations", National Journal (US), March 12, 2005.
87.
"Real reform requires an ongoing search for excellence
above all,
in the performance of our staff. In this I [new
Secretary-General Kofi Annan] will not compromise. I expect from
each and every staff member, at all levels, a total commitment to
excellence. I expect the Secretariat to work
together and at all times to function properly.
I pledge to you today that we will develop a new
management culture in the Organization. Our senior managers across the world
must understand their obligation to properly manage the staff -- the
human resources -- entrusted to their care. It is my
intention to
hold my managers accountable for providing the full range of
career support to their staff in their day-to-day work.
We are the United Nations, and we believe our
organization can fulfil the vision of our Charter
The excellence of our performance will turn our
detractors into supporters. We all know [that]
nobody argues with
success." "Secretary-General
urges staff to strive for excellence, stressing UN performance will turn
detractors into supporters", SG/SM/6140 of 9
January 1997, pp. 1,3, 4. [Note: See, however, the entry
below on accountability deficiencies eight years later, of 17 May 2005.]
88.
Sins of member states: Secretariat staff
resent
member state interference in
their daily work
[their
micromanagement of] the hiring and promotion of Secretariat
personnel.
. [and of] Secretariat budgeting,
. too often
seeking to control the minor details of spending allocations.
. Sins of the
Secretariat:
. Member states
contend that ineffective -- some would say nonexistent -- managerial
practices throughout the Secretariat have led to inefficient use of the
[UN resources]
; a staff unaccountable for its actions and prone to
delegate upwards;
a lack of transparency in Secretariat decision making
[on] policy issues, personnel, and budget expenditures.
much of the
information that is provided is not timely or readable.
Overall,
inefficiency and lack of accountability within the Secretariat, whether
perceived or real, have invited member state micromanagement. " "Making UN reform
work: Improving member state-Secretariat relations", Report of the
twenty-eighth United Nations issues conference, The Stanley Foundation, February 21-23, 1997, pp. 2, 14-16.
89.
"The General
Assembly
I.2. Regrets with deep concern
that further progress in the implementation of the adopted [human
resources] strategy has not been achieved
; 3.
Regrets the unsuccessful efforts to develop a
management environment and culture in the Organization
II.
Reaffirming its resolution 48/218A of
[1993], in particular
...
ensuring that programme managers are accountable for the effective
management of human resources allocated to them,
2.
Requests the
Secretary-General to
[impose] sanctions in
cases of demonstrated mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or
disregard for established rules and procedures
3.
to issue specific administrative instructions
[including] sanctions
for any financial loss suffered by the
United Nations as a result of gross negligence
; 4.
Deplores the high number of exceptions to the
established procedures for
[human resource decisions], in particular in
the [personnel office, OHRM]; 6.
Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to streamline
[administration]
through delegation of authority to programme managers
and to ensure, before
delegating such authority, that
well-designed mechanisms of accountability, including the necessary
internal monitoring and control procedures
, are put in
place
" "Human resources
management", General Assembly resolution 51/226 of 25 April 1997, Part I, paras. 2-4, Part II, first
preambular and paras. and 2-4, and 6. [emphasis added] 90.
"The General
Assembly,
Expressing deep
concern about the persistence of problems and defects observed by the
Board of Auditors in the financial administration and management of the
United Nations;
11. Notes
with deep concern the incidents of fraud and presumed fraud
reported by the Board of Auditors; 12. Requests the Secretary-General and the executive heads
to take the disciplinary
actions necessary in cases of proven fraud and to enhance the individual
accountability of United Nations personnel, including through stronger managerial
control;
" "Financial reports and
audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors,"
General Assembly resolution 51/225 of 16 May
1997.
[emphasis added] 91.
"UN employees -- who request anonymity because they fear they will
suffer more professional harm than the corrupt officials they want to
expose -- have provided numerous accounts of officials' being transferred
rather than dismissed after being caught breaking the rules. This happens frequently in cases of sexual
harassment, nepotism, and occasionally violence, according to these
accounts. Whistle-blowers are neither encouraged nor
rewarded." Barbara Crossette, "In war on corruption and waste,
UN confronts well-entrenched foe", International
Herald Tribune, 3 November 1997.
92.
"OHRM will convene
a task force of experts [to make
a] 'clear delineation of responsibilities' [which] is expected to lead to
a reduction in micro-management. [The IDR then notes that]
Micromanagement by intergovernmental bodies is an
index of the lack of trust between the majority of delegations and the UN
Secretariat.
[If this trend is to be reversed] there must be a much
clearer conceptualization of change, a balanced explanation of
implications, and an absolute sincerity of purpose. The current
perception of the Secretariat among many delegations is that in terms of
personnel policy it is confused, does not understand the full implications
of what is proposed, and has a hidden agenda.
In
pushing for reorientation, Ms. Salim speaks some home truths
'there is
'widespread staff distrust of management' and the UN's 'organizational
culture is one in which advancement is generally expected on the basis of
longevity rather than performance.'" "UN personnel chief
reviewing all aspects of management in bid to simplify controls, delegate
authority,", International Documents Review,
16 February 1998, p. 2. 93. "In
a rather scathing [1998] report, the General Assembly's Advisory Committee
on Administrative and Financial Questions (ACABQ) has dismissed the
'concept paper'
submitted by the Secretariat on 'Reducing and refocusing
of non-programme costs.'
Rather than call
for yet another report, the ACABQ suggests that a practical move at this
stage might be to 'set aside a preoccupation with concept and theory
to
concentrate on
specific new measures to increase the efficiency and
confirm the results arising out of the implementation of new measures as
well as those initiated prior to the current exercise." "Advisory Committee
rejects "non-programme costs" report", International Documents Review, 16 March 1998, page 5. 94.
"The job of secretary-general at the United Nations is not unlike
that of a medieval pope.
Until recently
[Kofi Annan]
seemed to have momentum on his side. But his
successful diplomatic crusade in Iraq
[is] unraveling
the UN's
monitors have been hustled out of Congo
the hard-won peace in Angola is
at vanishing point
[and] the
[UNHCR] faces unexpected allegations of
corruption.
Sooner or later
the UN will have to change
into the 'narrower and deeper' organization
reformers have always wished it would be. Mr. Annan is
nervous about the idea of a much narrower UN
[Yet]
the failure
by most popes to face up to the abuses within their own organizations
opened up the way to reformation of a more devastating type. Or as one
insider puts it: "If the UN's friends do not reform it, its enemies
will.'" "Reforming the United
Nations: Pope Kofi's unruly flock", The
Economist, August 8th, 1998, pp. 17-19.
95. "
The [1998 OIOS
annual] report is a guide to a variety of UN scandals
"The Second UN Conference on Human Settlements
is perhaps the crown jewel
[with]
an uncovered
deficit in the range of $2 million
The Conference 'never submitted a cost plan for the
use of the $8.2 million in voluntary contributions
and accounting for donor contributions was
incomplete. [OIOS does not address the question of how this
situation developed and was allowed to continue.]
"OIOS has investigated
an UNCTAD
staff member
who bilked the agency of over $600,000
by claiming travel and per diem expenses for non-existent experts
attending imaginary meetings. [OIOS does not
mention] that this imaginative individual was
caught only because he was hospitalized for a time and could not keep up
the charade.
This is surely material for a Hollywood comedy.]" "Reviewing 3+ years of work, [OIOS] sees continuing
problems - but reforms are afoot," International
Documents Review, 2 November 1998, pp.
1-4.
96. "The General Assembly
IV.
Delegation of authority and accountability
3.
notes that no comprehensive system of accountability and
responsibility has been established;
10.
Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General [of
25 April 1997] to enhance managerial
accountability with respect to human resources management
decisions, including imposing sanctions in case of demonstrated
mismanagement of staff and willful neglect of or disregard for established
rules and procedures, while safeguarding the right of due
process of all staff members, including managers." "Human resources management," General Assembly resolution 53/221 of 23 April 1999. [emphasis added]
97.
"The United Nations of today
is a better Organization in many
respects than, say, five years ago, and enhanced oversight has played its
part in that change. However, further
improvement within the United Nations is still necessary in many
ways.
Internal controls are not strong enough yet; accountability
continues to be blurred and misunderstood; delegation of authority must be
effectively executed; and human resources management is in need of further
reform, particularly in
the system of personnel assessment.
The
operational and psychological distance between Headquarters and the field,
that is, the other duty stations
remains a problem." Karl T. Paschke,
Under-Secretary-General and first head of the OIOS, in "Report of the
Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services" A/54/393 of 23 September 1999,
Preface.
98. "It
is not easy to admit the truth of Srebrenica, the Bosnian town where [in
1995] thousands of Muslim men were executed and hundreds buried alive
But in
its report on Monday, the United Nations accepts its share of the blame.
.
. In the recent
case of East Timor, the council supported the idea of a UN referendum on
independence but refused to send troops to deter a bloodbath that was
widely predicted. Sometimes the
United Nations' failure is built into its structure. Where a
permanent member of the Security Council opposes intervention, no action
will be authorized
But in cases where the Security Council does approve
action, it is fair to insist that it be serious. The UN member
states need to embrace force to secure peace; they need to shove
neutrality aside and denounce evil in order to combat it.
." "The UN apologizes", The Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, November 19, 1999.
99.
"After the humiliating failures of United Nations
peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Rwanda there was a consensus
. that new ways of undertaking them [needed urgently
to be] developed. That is what makes the recent decision
to deploy 5,500 U.N. peacekeepers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
so incomprehensible.
. As the United Nations itself now concedes, [the
efforts] in Rwanda and Bosnia
never had either the means or the mandate to
accomplish anything more than a bit of marginal humanitarian relief. [Yet in] the
proposed Congo deployment
. the identical mistakes are being made once
again.
The fact that they are being made with the best of intentions
alters nothing
Instead, it will seem as if the world tried to do
something for Africa, but nothing could be done. Such a
conclusion helps nobody, least of all those Africans who deserve so much
better from the rest of the world." David Rieff, "Making
the same mistakes: Memo to the United Nations: A peacekeeping mission to
Congo may do more harm than good", Newsweek, March 20,
2000.
100. "In recent
years, the United Nations has had fundamental problems. In 1994, the
U.N.'s inability to procure goods and services fairly and on time reached
a crisis.
Also there was an overall failure of its human resources system to
staff critical posts with the right people. Peacekeeping missions in Somalia,
Rwanda, and Bosnia failed to accomplish their mission. "[In 1997] The
Secretary General proposed a reform program
[and] set the end of 1999 as
the target to put the reforms in place.
The United Nations
has not yet implemented reforms to focus its programming and budgeting
on managing the Secretariat's performance. These initiatives
would enable Member States to hold the Secretariat accountable for
results and are key to the success of the overall reform
The U.N.
reform is an interrelated process and requires that all core elements be
in place to succeed." US General Accounting Office, "United Nations: Reforms are progressing, but overall objectives have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-169, May 10, 2000, pp. 2-3, and "United Nations: Reform initiatives have strengthened operations, but overall objectives have not been achieved", GAO/NSIAD-00-150, May 2000.
101. "After the
.
chaos in Sierra Leone, [many people have urged changes in UN The UN is always
short of the personnel it needs for peacekeeping operations.
First World countries with first-rate armies are usually
unwilling to put their troops at risk. Thus, When
peacekeepers perform badly, it is too politically embarrassing to remove
them.
This is particularly true of senior officials since they were often
given their jobs not because of their ability but because of the
country they represent. For instance, as the situation in
Sierra Dennis C. Jett, "The UN's peacekeeping failures are built in and intractable", International Herald Tribune, May 23, 2000. [Note: Mr. Jett is the author of Why peacekeeping fails, St. Martins, New York, 2000.] 102. "While there is currently a comprehensive system of [UN internal] justice in
place, its highly formalized nature leads to protracted and lengthy proceedings that are
in the interest of neither justice nor of the staff or
management. At present, the decision makers whose
administrative decisions are questioned are very rarely directly involved
in defending the cases. This has resulted in the
perception that the system shields managers from being held accountable
for their decisions." "Human resources management reform: Report of the
Secretary-General," UN document A/55/253 of 1
August 2000, para. 51. [emphasis added] 103. "The jurisdictional immunity of the [United Nations]
legally obligates it to have just and effective internal
processes to deal with grievances and appeals by staff,
and with disciplinary cases
[as] an indispensable
aid to maintaining staff morale, as well as enforcing
accountability."
"Accountability and
responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General", A/55/270 of 3 August 2000, Summary, para. 39.
[emphasis added]
104. "The present
report
presents the elements of an integrated and
effective system of accountability. It outlines the progress made
and
outlines changes
which will allow for the effective
implementation of the comprehensive system of accountability now
established.
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