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Archive Introduction


UN Performance Problems

UN Management Accountability Struggles


Where is the Rule of Law?

Inadequate UN Oversight

Recent Developments

 
  

 

 


Overview Quotes 3                

                                                                                                    

 

Overview of IO Watch Archive Quotes III

2005-June 2006

 

 

 

148.      "[The Volcker preliminary report] … has sharply criticized the United Nations for insufficiently auditing operations [of the oil-for-food program, especially] … at its New York headquarters. …

Oil contracts were not examined [closely] … despite the fact that UN officials had contract-approval responsibilities.'

Even where audits of the programme were done, there was often no follow-up. …

The UN has explained many of the programme's problems in terms of political games between powerful countries, but the audits reveal that the UN secretariat itself failed to exert necessary oversight.

The report said more comprehensive monitoring could have deterred the surcharge scheme on Iraqi oil contracts, … as well as undercutting the Iraqi government's kickback scheme for goods purchases. …"

Mark Turner, "UN criticized by Iraq oil-for-food inquiry", Financial Times (UK), January 11, 2005.

                                                                       

 

 

149.      "The resignation of Ruud Lubbers … over allegations of sexually inappropriate behaviour brought sighs of relief yesterday from UN officials in New York.

After allegations surfaced last year, Mr. Lubbers mounted a vigorous defence.

Mr. Annan chose to issue a stern warning but take no further action.  Since then, the UN has struggled to convince an increasingly skeptical audience that it is serious about addressing mismanagement. …

{It is clear that] … something of a revolution is also needed.

For a start, [UN senior officials] believe that the UN can no longer hand out 'jobs for the boys'  behind closed doors. …

… According to [an adviser to Mr. Annan], the UN faces 'a real crisis … an architectural crisis.'  The next seven months will determine whether the edifice can be refurbished or comes crashing down."

Mark Turner, "UN reformists see opportunity for change as Lubbers leaves", Financial Times (UK), February 22, 2005.

                                                                                               

 

 

150.      " … There is a culture of secrecy that characterizes not only the World Bank, but most of the vital international organizations -- including the United Nations.  Unless these public entities establish independent oversight, external auditing of managerial and financial controls and safe channels for reporting wrongdoing, scandalous harm will continue to weaken them and only compound the grief suffered by the billions of needy people they are mandated to serve."

Melanie Beth Oliviero, "More transparency", International Herald Tribune, February 26-27, 2005.    [Note: Ms. Oliviero is International Program Director of the Government Accountability Project, at www.whistleblower.org.]


 

 

151.      " … The issues raised in the … [Secretary-General's October 2004 report on internal justice] had been raised by the [ACABQ] as far back as 1985. … The problems alluded to had persisted over many years … The Committee takes this matter very seriously as it has a significant impact on staff morale and productivity as well as … [organizational efficiency] and could also have a significant financial impact. …

The Committee regrets that the [report  was late and unresponsive] …

The Committee has consistently maintained over the years that the problems besetting the administration of justice … involve much more than a perceived lack of resources; indeed, at the core of the matter lie difficulties with administrative processes and procedures and the culture of staff-management relations.  The Committee is once again prepared to look into this matter comprehensively. …

[It trusts that} … information will also be made available on how … [the General Assembly's 2003 request to link] the administration of justice and personal responsibility and accountability [is] being met."

"Administration of justice in the Secretariat: Interim report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions", UN document A/59/715 of 28 February 2005, paras. 3-4, 8, 10. [emphasis added]

                                                                                               

 

 

152.      "The United Nations … has its own ways of dealing with whistle-blowers.  Mostly, it fires them. … And although a supervisor's retaliation for whistle-blowing is officially prohibited under U.N. rules, enforcement comes only in the form of penalties against the offending supervisor [Note: if at all] -- not job reinstatement for the whistle-blower. …

Recent whistle-blowers interviewed by the National Journal suffered [the loss of their jobs.] …

Would-be U.N. whistle-blowers are on perilous ground, as they have no legal right to defend themselves.  'All they can do is complain and say the bully should be punished' said Tom Devine, legal director of the Government Accountability Project … The United Nations, Devine says, provides staff with fewer rights to defend themselves than 'any other government agency I've encountered, either on the national or the international level."

Corine Hegland, "Whistle-blowing at the United Nations", National Journal (US), March 12, 2005.   

                                                           

 

 

153.      "I recall the day in 1960 when the UN took charge of the Congo … [crisis because 'world opinion' deemed it] … the only body with 'clean hands.' 

Ideally the UN, foreshadowing a future world government, ought to be run by a global meritocracy -- rule by the best.  In practice, it is the opposite. Any state that can be legally defined as one can join the UN -- it is a club having no rules of probity or morals.

… The result is failure and graft.  UN officials are not answerable to bodies like Congress or the U.K.'s Parliament, which would be sure to track down, expose and punish gross abuses and manifest failures.  No senior UN official has ever gone to jail.  It's rare for anyone to be sacked or removed.  The top brass resist any kind of investigation, on principle.  The oil-for-food inquiry is unique in that it has taken place at all and seems to be garnering results.

But will any punishment be meted out?  Will any serious reforms be pushed through?  Of course not."

Paul Johnson, "The UN is for talk, not actions," Forbes (US), March 14, 2005.

[Note: Mr. Johnson is an eminent British historian and author.]

 

 

 

154.      "The United Nations Human Rights Commission, the UN's principal forum for promoting human rights, opens its annual six-week session today amid unprecedented criticism of its competence and credibility.

For years human rights groups have complained of growing politicisation and double standards that have stifled debate and allowed countries responsible for egregious abuses to escape condemnation. …

… The authoritative high-level panel on UN reform … last December said the reputation of the UN itself was threatened by the commission's 'legitimacy deficit' and 'eroding credibility and professionalism.'

[One expert] … reckons that about half the 53 members are there 'not to promote human rights but to undermine them.'  …

If there is general agreement that the commission is broken, there is less accord on how to fix it. …

… [The expert] … and others argue that countries with the worst human rights records should not be allowed to serve on the commission."

Frances Williams, "Double standards on human rights 'undermining UN'", Financial Times (UK), March 14, 2005.

                                                                                                   

 

 

155.      "The United Nations controversial peacekeeping operation in eastern Congo has received a further blow …

[An internal report,] … obtained by the Financial Times, charged that UN troops had not been tough enough in defending against renegade Congolese Army commanders … [which] threatened the shaky peace process …

Among its criticisms, the report cited poor leadership, misleading statements by the mission and the failure of a commander to follow orders …

The failure of the mission to use force during the crisis 'smeared the mission with the taint of impotence and cowardice', said the internally-commissioned report, and gave the perception 'that it had again failed the Congolese people at a critical moment.'

Monuc is the UN's most expensive peacekeeping operation, yet it has been widely criticized for incompetence, for failing to protect civilians, and becoming mired in sex scandals."

Andrew England, "UN report accuses peacekeepers of failing the Congolese people", Financial Times (UK), March 23, 2005.

                                                                       

 

 

156.      "A U.N. report on peacekeeper sex abuse released Thursday describes the U.N. military arm as deeply flawed and recommends withholding salaries of the guilty and requiring nations to pursue legal action against perpetrators.

 [The report] said abuses had been reported in missions ranging from Bosnia and Kosovo to Cambodia, East Timor, West Africa and Congo.  While allegations of abuse have dogged peacekeeping missions since their inception 50 years ago, the issue was thrust into the spotlight after the United Nations found [renewed problems in the Congo] earlier this year. …

 [The Jordanian ambassador and author of the report] … set 2007 as a target date to complete many of his recommendations …

"Parliaments, and especially those legislatures of the largest contributors to the U.N. peacekeeping budget, may feel ill at ease over continuing to extend support to peacekeeping in the absence of any significant change,' [he] said."

"U.N. report: Peacekeeping ops troubled," Associated Press, March 24, 2005.

                                                                                   

 

 

157.      " … When I worked in Liberia in the mid-Nineties a new [UN] chief administrative officer [replaced the previous CAO, who was taking kickbacks on UN procurement contracts.]  … The new CAO [moved aggressively for] … a 15 percent kickback on everything we purchased.

[He also tried to force many] … young 'local staff' to sleep with him … I was the human rights lawyer and these girls would come to my office in tears … [I wrote many memos. but] …. when I visited the UN [personnel] office in New York, they laughed at my naοve outrage: 'It happens all the time in the field', they said.  'There is nothing we can do.' …

That CAO had been knocking around West Africa for years, always mired in corruption, never disciplined, always promoted and reassigned … - during which time the head of personnel was Kofi Annan.  [The CAO] … was eventually indicted by US federal prosecutors in New York for $1.5 million of fraudulent kickbacks … He has since died.]

What kind of leadership would tolerate this conduct 10 years ago?  … Precisely the same leadership that [has now] … permitted the oil-for-food scandal and the sex-for-food scandal."          

Kenneth Cain, "How many more must die before Kofi quits?", The Observer (UK), April 2, 2005.

                                                                       

 

 

158.      "Dileep Nair [the head of the OIOS]… will be leaving the United Nations, on April 23, ostensibly disgraced.

[An interim Volcker report accused him] … of misusing Oil-for-Food funds and violating UN staff regulations. …

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, whose own conduct was found to be 'inadequate', issued a charge letter against Nair … Annan said he's 'relieved' he's been 'exonerated' by the ongoing Volcker investigation. …

 [Further, according to … the interim Volcker report, UN Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frιchette] intervened directly … to stop United Nations auditors from forwarding their investigations to the UN Security Council.  … Frechette does not dispute she may have intervened because audits are 'a management tool to be used only by internal managers.'"   

Marinka Peschmann, "The hell no I-won't-go Secretary-General, the accused UN auditor and Louise", Canada Free Press,  4 April, 2005.

                                                                                   

 

 

159.            "Anyone who was shocked by the most recent revelations of sexual misconduct by [UN staff has never been] … in a U.N.-sponsored refugee camp.  … The [UN] and its staff lack accountability. …                               

I arrived in Sierra Leone as a legal aid worker in … 2003, … one year after … Kofi Annan issue[d] a … 'zero-tolerance' policy … [But] I found abuse of a sexual nature almost every day …

In fact, … injustices of one kind or another were perpetrated by U.N. missions or their affiliated … [NGOs] every day in the camps I visited.  Corruption was the norm, in particular the embezzlement of food and funds by NGO officials, which often left camp resources dangerously inadequate. …

… In West Africa, most of the sexual misconduct accusations are leveled against local NGO staff members. 

If the UN … is to enjoy … immunity, it … [must] police itself aggressively and thoroughly. Yet … the message is: Cover your tracks and the United Nations will obstruct your prosecution.

After [a] 2002 report documented sexual abuse, Annan's steely resolve led to exactly zero criminal prosecutions of U.N. officials for sexual abuse.  The United Nations … needs a housecleaning."

Peter Dennis, "The UN: Preying on the weak", washingtonpost.com, April 12, 2005.

                                                          
 
                       

 

160.      "The General Assembly …

"Stressing that the system of justice in the United Nations as a whole should be independent, transparent, effective, efficient and fair,

Stressing the importance of increased transparency in decision-making and increased accountability of managers for the system,

Regretting that the present system of administration of justice in the Secretariat continues to be slow, cumbersome, and costly,

14.  Notes that staff rule 112.3, which relates to the financial liability of managers, has yet to be implemented …"

"47. Decides that the Secretary-General shall form a panel of external and independent experts to consider redesigning the system of administration of justice;

[49.(a) … [and]            propose a new model for resolving staff grievances … that is independent, transparent, effective, efficient and adequately resourced and that ensures managerial accountability; …

[49c.] … while acknowledging the uniqueness of the United Nations system, in particular the immunity of United Nations staff from national laws and thus the lack of recourse to national courts; …"

"Administration of justice at the United Nations", General Assembly resolution 59/283 of 13 April 2005, preambular and Part I, paras. 11-12, 14, and Part IV. [emphasis added]


 

 

161.      "The Advisory Committee is concerned about the unevenness in the quality of presentation in the [Secretary-General's reports on financing peacekeeping.]  While [it] recognizes the difficulties inherent in assembling [field] information … the ultimate responsibility rests with Headquarters for maintaining standards with regard to presentation, timeliness of submission, accuracy of figures and consistency in the definition and application of policies.

The Advisory Committee notes with concern a tendency … [by the Administration acting through peacekeeping budgets] to introduce initiatives with policy implications, rather than first seeking necessary guidance from the General Assembly. … 

Notable current examples of this [are] … discussed at greater length below …

The Committee strongly cautions against what appears to be a less than transparent means for changing policy …"

"Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions", UN document A/59/736 of 22 April 2005, paras. 31-32 and ff.                [emphasis added]

                                               

 

 

162.            "'Unprecedented challenges' faced by the UN have shown that the world body must immediately reform' …

[according to] background information distributed prior to a press briefing by [the UN Deputy Secretary-General.] ……

'The UN must take real action now … particularly in the critical areas of management, oversight and accountability' …

'Perhaps the most obvious shortcomings identified by the Volcker Inquiry and other crises are in the area of oversight and accountability. The current 'control' systems for monitoring management performance and preventing fraud and corruption are insufficient and must be significantly enhanced,' she said."

"Frιchette unveils UN reforms responding to Volcker panel's criticisms", UN News Service,17 May 2005.                [emphasis added]                                                                                                                                                               

 

 

163.      "The Famine Early Warning Systems Network … monitors the threat of mass hunger in some of the poorest parts of the world.  FEWS Net has published an inquiry into the world's failure to respond to food shortages in Niger and the rest of the Sahel.  The report is entitled simply: 'What went wrong?"  That is the right question to ask.  But what is surprising, and disconcerting, is that the report was written in 1997, not 2005.  This illustrates two things: Niger's present nightmare is a recurring one; and whatever went wrong in 1997 was not put right by 2005." 

"Famine relief: Starving for the cameras", The Economist, August 20th, 2005, pp. 10-11.

 

 

164.            "Vladimir Kuznetsov, a Russian diplomat in charge of a powerful UN budgetary oversight committee [the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)] was arrested by US authorities Thursday morning on money laundering charges.

The arrest deals yet another blow to the UN ahead of this month's summit of world leaders.  It is already braced for sharp criticism in next week's [Volcker] report … into corruption in the oil for food programme.

The [ACABQ] recommends to the General Assembly how the UN should spend its money.

Mr. Kuznetsov is accused of conspiring with an unnamed procurement officer to facilitate the secret payment of bribes from foreign companies seeking UN contracts."       

Mark Turner, "UN diplomat on laundering charge", Financial Times (UK), September 4, 2005.  [emphasis added]  [Note: See, in Google search, "Vladimir Kuznetsov ACABQ" .]

                                                           

           

 

165.      "The main conclusions are unambiguous.

The [United Nations] requires stronger executive leadership, thoroughgoing administrative reform, and more reliable controls and auditing. …

There was corruption within the United Nations at a critical management point.  There was exposure of important administrative and control weaknesses … The consequences? An avoidable loss of assistance to Iraq's population and a grievous loss of credibility to the United Nations. …

The Committee believes: first, 'professional disciplines' at the United Nations are weak and eroded …; second, there appears to be a pervasive culture of responsibility avoidance and resistance to accountability; third, there was … an absence of suitable administrative infrastructure; and fourth, there was an absence of adequate and independent control and auditing capacity."

Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (the "Volcker panel"), "The Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme", September 7, 2005, Volume I, pages 1, 9, 13. [emphasis added]    [Note: This and the two following reports are available in full at  http://www.iic-offp.org/ .]

 

 

166.      "Based on the evidence set forth in Chapters 1 through 5 of Volume III … the Committee finds as follows:

As the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations, the Secretary-General carried oversight and management responsibilities for the entire Secretariat.  That particularly included auditing and controls functions that had demonstrable problems …

… The record amply demonstrates a number of instances where there was a lack of support for and oversight of the Programme by the Secretary-General.  Some of the problems identified by the Committee are: (1) [an unclear and inappropriately monitored] … delegation to Deputy Secretary-General [Louise] Frιchette;  (2) an inadequate response to and investigation of reports of Iraqi abuses and corruption of the Programme, above all by failing to ensure that reports of Programme violations were brought to the attention of … the Security Council; (3) a lack of adequately ensuring that the sanctions objective of the Programme received appropriate attention; and (4) a failure to provide adequate oversight of the Executive Director of the Programme, Mr. [Benon] Sevan.

In sum, in light of these circumstances, the cumulative management performance of the Secretary-General fell short of the standards that the [UN] should strive to maintain."

Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (the "Volcker inquiry"), "The Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme", September 7, 2005, Volume III, p. 185. [emphasis added]

 

 

167.            "[Assessment of programme oversight]

OIOS did not have an adequate budget to properly investigate the [Oil-for-Food Programme]. …

The Committee notes that on at least three occasions OIOS [Investigations Division] referred complaints back to … the relevant departments to conduct their own internal inquiries.  … According to OIOS ID, complaints were regularly referred back to the entity submitting the complaint due to the limited financial resources. …

The Committee finds several deviations from 'best practices.'

[They] … included: (a) lack of direct reporting to an independent oversight board; (b) failure to perform risk assessments to professional … standards; and (c) lack of budgetary independence. …

OIOS ID is generally not supported and accepted across the United Nations by both management and staff.  This, together with a lack of a whistleblower protection policy, prevents OIOS ID from successfully carrying out its mandate."

Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (the "Volcker inquiry"), "The Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme", September 7, 2005, Volume IV, pp.71, 73, 77. [emphasis added]

 

 

168.            "Tomorrow's summit of world leaders teetered on the brink of fiasco … as substantive reforms promoting human rights and overhauling the UN's top management risked being killed off by a group of developing countries fearful of western intervention. …

Diplomats said … Russia, China and some … developing countries had emasculated calls for a smaller, more effective human rights council …

Meanwhile, India was objecting to the establishment of a new international legal principle, the 'responsibility to protect' … and tougher language on tackling terrorism was bogged down as some countries insisted [on a balancing statement] asserting the right of oppressed peoples to self-determination, a formulation that some saw as a get-out clause. …

Hopes the summit would agree to expand the Security Council died this summer when would-be new members failed to agree a common position on such reform."

Mark Turner, "UN summit faces fiasco amid threat to reforms", Financial Times (UK), September 13, 2005.

                                     

 

169.      "This week, on the 60th anniversary of the United Nations, world leaders met to endorse a new statement of common aims.  The main aim?   To help humanity speak with one voice.

Fixing the UN itself has been a top agenda item for years. But finding a consensus among 191 members has become vexing as more demands are made on an out-of-date system for global group action.

A move away from a single global body to shifting networks of permanent and temporary alliances may better reflect the historic globalizing forces in the 21st century.  The United Nations remains ossified in the world of 1945 and the Cold War.  It still has its uses, and another round of reform is needed.  But barring that, the alternatives to the UN are looking better and better."

"Fixing the United Nations", Boston Globe, in the International Herald Tribune, September 17-18, 2005.

                                                           

 

 

170.      "The Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) … [continued to discuss] the report of the International Civil Service Commission … and the proposed framework on new contractual arrangements within the United Nations. …

Jamaica's representative, speaking on behalf of the 'Group of 77' developing countries and China … stated that the Group was prepared to consider the proposed system of continuing, fixed-term and temporary contracts … but also emphasized the importance of job security for staff members, saying that it was vital to ensure impartiality, independence and integrity of the staff."

"UN pay and benefits review, new contract framework among issues, as budget committee debates …",  UN document GA/AB/3693 of 21 October 2005.

                                                           

 

 

171.      "As the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) today continued its general debate on the budget proposal for 2006-2007 following its introduction by Secretary-General Kofi Annan yesterday, several speakers expressed concern over increasing extrabudgetary funding of United Nations activity …

While the budget proposal … amounts to $3.6 billion, it is expected that some $5.6 billion in extrabudgetary resources will be utilized for a variety of activities …

[also the regular budget did not include] … the cost of United Nations peacekeeping operations [nearly $8 billion from 1 July 2004 to June 30 2006, and international tribunals] …

Speakers also noted that most of the 3,019 'ineffective, obsolete and marginally useful' outputs proposed for termination during the biennium were related to development activities.

China's representative said that all resource appropriations must be accompanied by reasonable justification. The Organization should match resources with actual requirements, rein in resource growth, improve management and use resources effectively."

"Concern expressed over increasing extrabudgetary funding of UN activities …", UN document GA/AB/ 3698 of 26 October 2005, pp. 1-2.    [emphasis added]

                                                           

 

 

172.      "[A report by Deloitte Consulting LLP, a global accounting and consulting firm, found that] unless addressed soon, serious oversight and safeguard deficiencies leave the United Nations procurement system open to fraud …

The report found … 'a significant reliance on people [which] leaves the UN extremely vulnerable to potential fraudulent or corrupt activity, and limits the Organization's means to either prevent or detect such actions.'

The assessment also found weaknesses in ethics and integrity training, which were not supported by management, along with a 'lack of urgency in response to adverse audit findings, and unclear lines of authority and accountability.'

The report recommends remedies for each of the adverse conditions …"

"Report on UN procurement calls for better safeguard and oversight systems", UN News Service, 6 December 2005.  [emphasis added]   [Note: Available, at Google Search, under "Deloitte Consulting   UN procurement" .]


 

 

173.            "[Secretary-General Kofi Annan at his year-end press conference said] … The year about to end has been a really difficult one -- from the tsunami to events in Lebanon and Darfur and beyond. …  Let us look forward to what we can and must do next year. …

I hope [Member States] …. will agree on a package of management reforms that I shall put before them in February. …

If there's one thing I would like to hand over to my successor when I leave office next year, it is that it should be a UN that is fit for the many varied tasks and challenges that we are asked to take on today."

'Transcript of press conference by [the Secretary-General", UN document SG/SM/10280 of 21 December  2005.

                                                           

 

 

174.      "[A year after the South Asian tsunami disaster ] … pledges of transparency and accountability for the UN's [$1.1 billion 'flash appeal'] … appear a long way from being realised.  This is primarily blamed on dueling UN bureaucracies and accounting methods plus what in many cases appears to be institutional paranoia about disclosure …   

… [Broad totals exist, but] … what is harder to determine is how that money has actually been spent, according to a two-month investigation by the Financial Times. …

The only way to [get details on some $100 million projects] is to approach each of the 39 agencies listed in the appeal, UN officials say. …

[An NGO financing expert says, for instance] that no international standards exist for … reasonable overhead costs.  And what is disclosed by aid agencies is often 'meaningless.' …

After a year spent pledging transparency, it appears the disaster relief world has a long way to go before it catches up with the private sector."

Shawn Donnan, "Little clarity on how aid gets spent", Financial Times (UK), December 23, 2005.      [emphasis added]

                                                                       

 

 

175.      "Tasked by world leaders at the largest summit in United Nations history with giving new momentum to global development goals and strengthening the 60-year-old body, the General Assembly wrapped up its 2005 substantive session agreeing on two landmark decisions: to establish a new Peacebuilding Commission … and to launch a new standby relief fund that will provide instant cash in the wake of natural disasters. …

Those decisions … cap what Secretary-General Kofi Annan has described as a 'difficult year' for the United Nations …

Left pending, however, were the more nettlesome Summit proposals, with decisions on the creation of an upgraded Human Rights Council, completion of negotiations on an anti-terrorism convention and a plan to increase oversight of United Nations activities, all delayed, so far, until next year.  The Assembly also pledged to continue the search for … [an expanded] Security Council …"

" … 60th General Assembly takes first steps toward major UN reform …", UN document GA/10444 of 27 December 2005.

                                                                       

 

176.      "On the first anniversary of the … [South Asian tsunami, the media emphasized that] … we are powerless in the face of natural disasters. …

[However,] governments and international organizations should start paying serious attention to … disaster preparedness. …

Disaster prevention programs might seem to be luxuries for impoverished countries.  But … according to the Tearfund, a British development group, … every dollar spent on prevention … [can save] a further $4 to $10 on relief and reconstruction.

Developing countries are by far the hardest hit … Of more than two million people killed in natural disasters in the last 20 years, 98 percent were from poor countries. …

[An Earth Institute expert recently wrote that] … "With natural hazard cycles repeating themselves every few years, developing countries find themselves in a vicious cycle of loss and recovery … The international community [should] manage disaster risk as an integral part of development planning rather than only as a humanitarian issue.

What are we waiting for?"

Anders Wijkman, "We can minimize natural disasters", International Herald Tribune, December 31, 2005-January 1, 2006. 

 

 

 

177.      "The United Nations is conducting some 200 investigations into its procurement activities and has placed eight officials on special leave …

[The UN's top manager] said a just-completed report of the UN's internal watchdog [the OIOS] raised 'a number of serious allegations and concerns' about UN procurement. …

He outlined steps the Organization has taken to improve its procurement practices, including providing more resources to OIOS so that it can undertake a wider investigation of the UN's spending on supplies and services. …

He repeatedly thanked 'the courageous men and women of the United Nations who have continued to come forward to report fraud.'

 … 'We are ferreting out corruption and fraud where it existed and where it exists,' he stated. …

[Audit excerpts] described systemic failures  'The design and maintenance of controls …  were insufficient' … 'Important controls were lacking while existing ones were often bypassed.'"

"UN announces over 200 procurement investigations and puts 8 staff on leave", UN Secretariat News Service, 23 January 2006.    [emphasis added]

                                                           

 

           

178.      "In a sense, the alleged irregularities in peacekeeping procurement [recently reported], involving possible waste and fraud of up to $300 [million], do more damage to the UN's reputation than the larger abuse of the UN oil-for-food programme for Iraq. … The UN Secretariat could rightly put some of the blame on the Security Council [in oil-for-food] …The secretariat has no such plausible scapegoat in its mismanagement of peacekeeping procurement."

"UNcovering waste: The world's peacekeeping requires better bookkeeping", Financial Times (UK), January 26, 2006.   [emphasis added]   [Note: Many other articles are emerging on this topic, see under Google Search, "UN procurement scandal".]

                                               

 

 

179.            "Governments are violating the human rights of their own citizens as tsunami survivors endure discrimination, inadequate housing and assaults one year after the tragedy swept through Southeast Asia, [says] a study released today