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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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January-February
2007
308. “Stressing
his determination to follow through on the goal of [UN] management reform
… Ban Ki-moon used his first address to staff … to call on them to help
make the Organization more mobile, professional and capable …
Noting
that ‘staff morale has plummeted’ in recent years in the wake of ‘harsh
and sometimes unfair criticism’ of the Secretariat on areas from lack of
accountability to ethical lapses, Mr. Ban said … ‘some of [the criticisms]
warrant our urgent attention, and we must take bold steps to dispel
them.’ He
vowed to make meritocracy his watchword on human resources … set career
development as a top priority … and encourage staff
mobility. Mr.
Ban said he would look to senior managers to inspire, motivate and bring
out the best in staff, and he urged all staff to be forthright in
expressing their views, even when they are discussing shortcomings or
problems at the UN.” “Addressing
staff, new Secretary-General renews commitment to UN management reform”,
UN
News Service,
2 January 2007.
309a. “Secretary-General
Ban Ki-Moon today appointed
Alicia Bárcena Ibarra as head of the
United Nations Department of Management,
voicing confidence that the Mexican national, who has extensive experience
both within and outside the world body, will contribute to his efforts to
strengthen it. … Ms. Barcena will be charged with carrying out the
new direction being set by
Mr. Ban, who has pledged
‘continuity along with change’ and
has made transforming the Organization a top priority
… ‘The
Secretary-General highly values her leadership and managerial skills’ …
[a] spokesperson said. …” “Secretary-General
Ban names Mexican sustainable development official as UN management
chief”, UN News
Service,
3 January 2007. [Note:
The UN article noted that she served as a mid- and senior-level official
in the UN’s regional economic commission in Latin America, founded an
Earth Council group in Costa Rica, and was a Director-General of Fisheries
and Vice-Minister of Ecology for the Mexican Government, before becoming
Chef de Cabinet for Kofi Annan.
It did not underscore that she will now be the top manager in
charge of effectively managing (and reforming) a $20 billion-a-year
headquarters and field operation worldwide.]
309b. “Ban Ki Moon … has
appointed a Mexican environmentalist who was chief of staff to the former
secretary general, Kofi Annan, to spearhead United Nations reform efforts
… At a
news conference Wednesday … a UN spokeswoman … was peppered with questions
about Bárcena’s
management expertise and ability to carry out extensive reforms – which
Ban has said are critical to enable the
organization.” “Mexican
and Briton are named to key UN jobs”, Associated
Press,
January 5, 2007.
309c. “Ban Ki-moon …
yesterday announced two revealing new appointments to his senior
management team, putting … a Mexican former UN staff chief as head of
management. … [Analysts]
… suggested the move indicated a continuity in the way the UN does
business, despite Mr. Ban’s calls for an overhaul of its working methods,
by bowing to the tradition of awarding top jobs to permanent Security
Council members and retaining a figure central to the last
regime. The
appointment of Alicia
Bárcena
of Mexico, a biologist, to head management is also likely to court some
controversy. … She was Mr. Annan’s chief of
staff in the final year, and will be seen by some as a sign that the old
guard still holds sway, despite calls by staff for a thorough change in
the mindset of senior management.
Mr.
Ban is expected to announce a new deputy over the coming days, widely
expected to be a woman from the developing world …” Mark
Turner, “UN chief appoints senior aides to top posts”, Financial
Times
(UK), January 4, 2007.
Note: For more on the new Deputy Secretary-General, see items 309g.
and 309h. below.]
309d. “Laying down a
challenge to Ban Ki-moon, the UN’s Staff Council this week passed
an Expression of No
Confidence in Jan Beagle,
long-time head of the UN’s Office of Human Resource Management. Among the grounds are
Ms. Beagle’s hindrance of
reforms to the UN’s archaic system of employee rights and internal
justice. The stakes are high,
as Mr.
Ban’s selection to head the Department of Management, Alicia Barcena, is a strong supporter of Ms.
Beagle. Along with 57 other senior UN officials, Ms. Beagle was asked
to submit a resignation letter earlier this month. If Mr. Ban decides to keep Ms.
Beagle on, the Staff Council’s next steps would seem to be
pre-determined.” Mathew
Russell Lee, “At the UN, dice rolled on Jan Beagle …”, Inner City
Press,
January 26, 2007.
309e. “Before [Alicia
Barcena’s appointment as the UN’s new top manager was announced], … one
U.N. official told FOX News the appointment of a non-American to the post
would be a “disaster” for the U.S.-led effort to reform the United
Nations. … [Her
predecessor, American Christopher Burnham,] was previously the chief
financial officer in the U.S. State Department and had been state
treasurer of Connecticut. He
was appointed … in [2005] and spearheaded the [UN] institutional reform
efforts that were promised by Annan … Barcena’s
career has focused not on management expertise but on public policies for
sustainable development … Barcena also is a onetime protégé
of Maurice Strong, the former special adviser to Annan who resigned his
last U.N. post after it was revealed he had received about $1 million for
a family-owned firm… [with] ties to the Oil-for-Food scandal. She also has ties to outgoing
Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown. [A
US expert said] … the idea of someone from Annan’s ‘discredited regime’
getting the job is ‘worrying.’ … What’s needed, he added, is someone who’s
serious about reform and …
‘willing to stamp out corruption and mismanagement within the
United Nations.’” Liza
Porteus, “New Secretary-General names non-American to top U.N. management
post”, Fox
News,
January 3, 2007.
309f. “Two weeks into
the Ban Ki-moon era … there are signs that he is yet to score a decisive
victory over the intractable bureaucratic machine, while the machine has
already scored a significant number of points. Several
insiders from Kofi Annan’s heyday have already been named to key positions
[including Mr. Annan’s former special adviser, Vijay Nambiar, now the
chief of staff replacing Alicia Barcena.] … Mr.
Ban has demanded the resignation, as of today, of 60 top aides. But now, the question is whether
he intends to really rid himself of the old-timers or just reshuffle the
deck. … It is
not too late. … Mr. Ban yet may prove to embody the gale of fresh air that
this staid organization needs. … But
at the United Nations,
anyone who fails to control the perpetual bureaucaracy risks being
controlled by it. … At this
early stage, it is clear that Turtle Bay will resist allowing ‘Ban to be
Ban’ …
If
anything, he now needs to depart altogether from [Annan’s constant
comments] … on world affairs, concentrating instead on fixing the world
inside Turtle Bay.” Benny
Avni, “Advice to Ban Ki-moon: Control or be controlled”, The New York
Sun,
January 15, 2007.
309g. “One of the unlucky
features of Ban Ki-moon’s first two weeks as UN Secretary-General has been
the absence of a … honeymoon period. … The general expectation …was that
perceptions of mismanagement, corruption, lack of accountability and
missed reform opportunities – the legacy of Kofi Annan’s final years as
secretary-general – would carry over … [But]
Ban’s performance … has
raised an enormous level of disquiet. …
Nothing has fanned these
flames more than Ban’s decision to appoint Tanzania’s novice foreign
minister, Asha-Rose Migiro, as his deputy.
… The
favorite on most lists was former Nigerian finance and foreign minister
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a highly regarded … economist with senior-level
experience at the World Bank.
[But one story circulating is that Nigerian President Olusegun
Obasanjo suddenly withdrew his support, and Ban offered the job on a
one-day notice to Migiro.] … In
New York the reaction was … [disbelief.] Before her surprise elevation to
foreign minister, [Migiro’s] ministerial experience had been limited to a
junior social affairs portfolio. …
Most importantly, Migiro had little background in management, yet
Ban was entrusting her with one of the most difficult management jobs
imaginable: the day-to-day oversight of the entire weird and wonderful UN
bureaucracy.”
David
Nason, “UN chief ‘hits the ground stumbling’”, The
Australian,
January 15, 2007.
309h. “Not everyone expects
that the appointment of … Asha-Rose Migiro … will aid reform of the
[United Nations.] I am one of
them. For
the sheer feel-good factor, … [her selection was wonderful news. But she has little experience] …
and Tanzania’s government, like those of most other African countries, is
not a paragon of efficiency.
So it’s doubtful … [whether she] can manage a Byzantine UN
bureaucracy plagued by corruption and sexual abuse
scandals. The
real limitation … [is that] too much reform in international organizations
like the UN and World Bank is concentrated on form and fair distribution
of the spoils, than on policy and process. Campaigns for the appointment of
[overlooked groups] tend to be very popular … but when it comes to … [cuts
so] that more money goes to feed the hungry or vaccinate children, the
enthusiasm withers. … A lot
of the campaigners for … reform are usually themselves riders on [the]
gravy train.
… There’s
also a cynical subtext … [with many expecting the Dr. Migiros of this
world to fail in the jobs the West gave them] …. When they fail, it only fuels
further the stereotype that we are incompetent.” Charles
Onyango-Obbo, “Raising Africans to top global jobs is setting them up to
fail”, The East
African,
Jan 29, 2007. [Note:
Both Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala of Nigeria -- and Dr. Anna Tibaijuka, another
Tanzanian woman, the Executive Director of UN Habitat, and until the
Migiro appointment the highest-ranking African woman in the UN system --
have very impressive managerial and performance records (see their
Wikipedia entries found via Google search using their names.) A cynic
would say that this is precisely why the carryover crowd of “Annistas”
advising Mr. Ban did not discover them, with the former suddenly (and
explicably) eliminated and the latter ignored. Ms. Migiro’s Wikipedia entry, in
contrast, is essentially only her new UN top-level
appointment.]
310a. “The United Nations
said last night that it was launching an investigation into allegations
reported in the Daily Telegraph that its peacekeepers and staff have
abused children in southern Sudan. … ‘There is no greater smear on the whole UN name
than these persistent claims of sexual abuse by its troops on the people
they are supposed to protect’,
said … [a Refugees International expert.] … This goes on to some extent in every UN mission
across the world and
the new secretary-general must make sure it is at the top of his agenda.’
… Officials
with the southern Sudan government, which enjoys close relations with the
UN mission, called for immediate investigations. ‘This has shocked everyone’, said
James Wani Iga, the speaker of the legislature. ‘The people responsible must be
hunted down. The abuse of children is clearly a human rights abuse of the
worst kind’. … The director
of a Sudanese charity working with abused children … said ‘People here
have been talking about it for so long, now we must see some action … Our
children are suffering enough.’” Mike
Pflanz, “UN pledges to hold inquiry into Sudan abuse allegations”,
The
Daily Telegraph
(UK), January 3, 2007.
310b. “Nearly 200 United
Nations peacekeepers have been disciplined in the past three years for sex
offenses … the UN has admitted.
Yet none appears to have been prosecuted. Senior
UN officials said on Friday that 319 soldiers, police or civilians … have
been investigated for sexual misconduct over the past three years, and 180
have been dismissed or repatriated. These
numbers do not include allegations leveled at members of the UN’s own
staff. According to [a recent] internal UN report, these total 91 …
[people.] … [A
senior UN official,] Jane Holl Lute, said that … with nearly 200,000
people from more than 100 countries rotating through the peacekeeping
missions every year, some people ‘are going to behave badly’, … “What’s
different now is … our determination to stay with this problem … and
constantly improve our ability to deal with it.” … Under
UN regulations, servicemen and women can only be prosecuted in their home
countries, not in the country where they are serving. [Documented abuses go back to the
1990s.]”
Francis
Elliott and Ruth Elkins, “UN shame over sex scandal”, The
Independent
(UK), January 7, 2007.
[Note: For the painful history of this ongoing scandal, see
Refugee Sexual
Abuses
in the IO Watch Archive.]
310c.
“Incidents of sexual exploitation in U.N. peacekeeping missions
around the world have become depressingly routine … in four continents
altogether. … The United States must send a clear message
that it will not tolerate abuse in U.S.-funded peacekeeping
operations and
must press strongly for the prosecution of U.N. peacekeepers by their own
national governments. … By launching its own
investigations into
peacekeeper abuse, as well as holding hearings on the issue, the House and
Senate can dramatically
raise the international profile of the matter and
force the U.N. to treat the issue with the seriousness it deserves.
… Congress
and the Executive Branch can also apply pressure for the establishment of
an external watchdog for U.N. operations, accountable to the U.N. Security
Council, but comprised of non-U.N. staff. Only a genuinely independent oversight
mechanism can ensure the kind of accountability and scrutiny that is so
badly needed for U.N. peacekeeping operations.” Nile
Gardiner, Ph D., and Steven Groves, “The United States must act to end
abuses by UN peacekeepers”, The Heritage
Foundation,
WebMemo #1314, 16 January 2007. [Note: The full article, including
detailed recommendations, is available at www.heritage.org
under “International organizations.” IO Watch finds this initiative of
national legislative bodies making in-depth investigations and holding
hearings, neither of which the UN does on a continuing basis, is
enormously important, and long overdue, to establish independent and
effective Member State oversight of UN operations. Significant recent
efforts to this end by the US Congress and the General Accountability
Office are found under Top
Sources, “Reports” on the IO Watch home
page.]
311a. “The UN Development
Program is, on paper, overseen by and accountable to an Executive Board
made up of 36 member states.
But a meeting of this Board on January 4, entitled ‘Evaluation of
UNDP assistance to conflict-affected countries’ was run more like a UNDP
propaganda session.
… The
evaluation brags that ‘One of UNDP’s perceived strengths is that some of
its procedures are currently more flexible than those of other actors in
the UN system.’ This is
followed by a critique that the facts and this series [of Inner City Press
articles] bear out, that there is ‘difficulty in obtaining information
about what UNDP does’ and that UNDP should provide more “on projects,
budgets, procurement and recruitment.’ … To this list, ‘audits’ should be
added. While UNDP’s response
purports to agree with this recommendation, none of the listed ‘management
actions’ addresses transparency or information in any way.
… Speaking
of incomplete, on UNDP’s website the most recent evaluations run through
March 2005 – that is, nearly two years out of date.” Matthew
Russell Lee, “At UNDP, evaluation means paid praise while transparency is
ignored and information withheld”, Inner City
Press,
January 5, 2007.
311b. “The failure of the UN Development Program to
provide copies of its audits, even to the 36 countries which serve on its
Executive Board, was
raised on Monday to Spanish president Jose Luis Rodriquez Zapatero. Spain had just announced a major
fund with UNDP … ‘In
the management of public funds, transparency must be a constant demand’,
[he] said. ‘Of course, the government of Spain, as an active contributor
to UN programs, always wants maximum transparency … That is fundamental.’
… Ad
Melkert [UN USG and UNDP Associate Administrator] on December 15 answered
Inner City Press’ questions by stating that he is now aiming for more
transparency. … [As a UN News writeup put it] … ‘Mr. Melkert said any
report he had told staff not to talk to the press was ‘absolutely totally
ludicrous.’’ But he added he would like the agency’s transparency level to
reach wider UN standards. … ‘I think that should be normal, so l‘m looking
into that at this moment.” Matthew
Russell Lee, “UNDP will be called to greater transparency, says President
of Spain, on UNDP’s Board”, Inner City
Press,
December 18, 2006.
[Note: the UN’s standards are hardly higher: see “Opacity and
dissembling, not transparency” under The Six “Black Holes” of UN
Non-accountability
on the IO Watch home page.]
312. “It may be
unwise to keep highlighting the dispatch of Jan Eliasson as a Special
Envoy to Darfur as one way of showing action taken. There have been so many envoys
before the earnest Swede and even the Secretary General Kofi Annan, an
African expatriate, was literally taken round in circles during his widely
televised visit a year ago.
Actually, part of the problem is that there have been so many
Special Envoys and Representatives that host countries threat their
arrival and departure with a revolving door approach – an embrace at the
entrance and satirical smile at the exit. What
are those EIGHTEEN Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary
General in Africa doing? Very
few would know. What the
general public knows is that despite political posturing, the U.N.
Secretariat has been useless in Darfur and clueless in Somalia.
… An
increasingly complicated situation in an increasingly rough
neighborhood. … It does
require alerted close follow-up.
What role to play and when would depend on an enlightened
well-informed evaluation. … Meanwhile, we return to our earlier question
and repeated refrain: what
are those EIGHTEEN Special Envoys of the Secretary General in Africa
doing? Where are they? WHO are
they?” “United
Nations. Useless in Darfur,
clueless on Somalia”, UNforum,
15 January 2007.
[Note: This article is available in full at www.unforum.com.]
313a.
“Former
U.N. Oil-for-Food chief Benon Sevan [and his associate Ephraim Nadler
have] been indicted in New York federal court for allegedly taking bribes under the program from Saddam
Hussein’s regime … Specifically, the two were charged with wire fraud, based on their
depriving the United Nations of its right to Sevan’s honest services;
bribery concerning [the UN]; …; and conspiracy to commit these
offenses. If convicted, Sevan would face a maximum sentence of
50 years [and] Nadler … 112 years imprisonment if convicted. Warrants have
been issued for the two through Interpol. In February 2005 … then Manhattan District [Attorney]
Robert Morgenthau had launched a criminal probe into Sevan … About a week
earlier, [Paul] Volcker said Sevan had ‘seriously undermined’ the
integrity of the United Nations. Sevan … was retired by the time the Volcker report was
released.
Volcker
and his panel were unable to conclude if Sevan actually took bribes
because they were prohibited from issuing
subpoenas. But [South African justice] Richard
Goldstone, a member of the Volcker group, told Fox News he believed the
threshold had been reached for criminal charges against Sevan.” “Former U.N. Oil-for-Food chief Benon Sevan indicted
over bribes from Saddam’s regime”, Fox News, January 16, 2007.
313b. “Benon Sevan … was indicted
yesterday on federal charges … as part of a growing attempt by prosecutors to hold UN employees
accountable to US law. … The case highlights a multi-pronged effort led by US
attorney Michael Garcia of the southern district of New York to tackle law
breaking at the UN. … ‘The UN as an entity … [is] sitting in
the middle of New York’ [he said.] ‘We’re the office that has the
responsibility for looking at the corruption at the UN. It’s here,
just like Wall Street is here.’ Since Mr Garcia’s arrival in New York from Washington
in 2005, his office has brought about 10 cases against current and former
UN employees.
The
charges range from visa fraud and selling illegal drugs to procurement
fraud and bribery charges. … This summer, authorities broke up a drug ring that was
using UN diplomatic pouches – among other methods – to smuggle the
stimulant khat into the US. Mr Garcia said his efforts had not been
hampered by diplomatic immunity issues. ‘There’s never been a case where we
wanted to go forward and we couldn’t’, he said.” Brooke Masters and Mark Turner, “Former chief of
oil-for-food scheme faces US charges”, Financial Times (UK), January 17,
2007.
313c. “A close relative of a
former secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, … Ephraim Nadler, was
indicted yesterday … on charges related to the oil-for-food scandal. … However, it
was not clear yesterday whether [Benon Sevan and Nadler], who have stayed
away from America, would even bother to put up a defense. … Mr. Nadler is
believed to be holed up in Geneva. The federal authorities asked Interpol to locate and
attain Messrs. Nadler and Sevan and ‘will seek their arrest and
extradition to the United States’ … Meanwhile, the indictment demanded the two forfeit nearly $145
million. American assets of the defendants – such
as Mr. Nadler’s [Manhattan] apartment and a house owned by Mr. Sevan in
the Hamptons … -- may also be subject to forfeiture. … … “The U.S. Attorney’s office and the Manhattan
District Attorney’s Office have joined forces to uncover and prosecute any
corruption or other illegal activities connected to that program.” Mr.
Morgenthau said. [A UN spokesman] … said the United Nations has been
cooperating with oil for food investigations, ‘and will continue to do so’
… [but] couldn’t touch Mr. Sevan’s pension fund … estimated [by a
knowledgeable source] … to be worth ‘around $1 million.’” Benny Avni, “Indictments are new stage in oil for
food”, The New York
Sun, January 17, 2007.
313d. “In what surely qualifies as
the single-most-promising UN reform to date, federal prosecutors …
[announced the indictment of Benon Sevan, which] is, in its way, a neat
retort to attempts by Sevan’s old boss, … Kofi Annan, to downplay the
landmark Oil-for-Food scam in terms of ‘If there was a scandal.’ … It’s been almost two years since Sevan slipped [away]
… to his native Cyprus … It seemed all [he] had to do was sit
back in Nicosia … and wait for the U.S. statute of limitations to expire.
… [But] with charges now brought against him, …he could be nabbed if he
tries to travel across national borders. … The
issue … now is what happens when a high-ranking U.N. official is alleged
by both a U.N. authorized investigation and U.S. federal prosecutors to
have taken bribes from a U.N.-sanctioned tyrant. Annan’s response … was to keep quite
about it and do nothing. But … Ban Ki-moon … [seeks to] ‘Restore
Trust’ in the U.N. If [he] is serious, the way to start
would be to call loudly and often for Sevan to return to New York and face
justice.” Claudia Rosett, “Under the law”, National Review (US), January 17,
2007.
313e. “Benon Sevan no longer works
for the United Nations. But his indictment on federal corruption
charges … points to a continuing problem … that Secretary General Ban Ki
Moon needs to tackle without further delay. … [Mr. Sevan] is a typical product of a system in which
who you know and where you come from counts for more than merit or
vision. … The legal question of Sevan’s guilt or innocence
cannot be properly resolved unless he returns to this country for
trial. He
may choose not to. … There is plenty of blame to go around. Security
Council members ,,,, failed to monitor [oil-for-food] administration
diligently and winked at Iraqi oil smuggling that benefited American
allies. But eliminating the dirty little bargains [of] ...
international diplomacy will be a lot harder than reforming the UN’s
dysfunctional personnel system. That system’s multiple failings … [have]
badly hurt the United Nations’ credibility and effectiveness … Ban has
repeatedly talked about reforming this disastrous personnel system.
But his early appointments show little sign of doing
so.
Sevan’s
indictment should be a reminder of why Ban needs to do
better.” “A product of the UN system”, International Herald
Tribune, January 22, 2007.
314a.
“Fourteen UN aid agencies have warned that they may soon no longer
be able to ‘hold the line’ against mass suffering in Darfur as they become
the target of increasing violence. … The alarm bells come as the UN struggles to put in
place a viable international protection mission in Darfur, but faces
constantly shifting Khartoum government positions on the deployment of a
UN-African Union ‘hybrid’ force. … The UN has not even elicited support for a ‘heavy
package’ of support for the current EU mission, to be put in place before
the hybrid. … But as discussions continue with limited progress the
UN agencies say aid workers have come under direct fire. … ‘Twelve relief
workers have been killed in the past six months – more than in the
previous two years combined,’ [the statement] said. ‘If this situation continues, the humanitarian
operation and welfare of the population it aims to support will be
irreversibly jeopardized.’” Mark Turner, “UN warns of failure ‘to hold the line’
in Darfur”, Financial Times (UK), January 18, 2007. 314b. “Are locally hired aid
workers really facing greater risks? According to a new report by the Centre
on International Cooperation, … locally hired staff, who make up around
four-fifths of aid agency employees, are at particular risk. … The
[expatriates,] expensive and potentially litigious if things go wrong,
have better kit and training, but when things get ugly they often
withdraw, leaving untrained locals to dodge the bullets. Aid groups, it
says, have failed to consider the ethics of this. … But the real reason for the rising … [violent
incidents] could be the boom in aid: the number of employees rose by 77%
from 1997 to 2005; the aid agencies’ budgets have more than doubled in
real terms. … [And] foreign aid workers, not locals, … [may be] at the
greatest risk overall. [In 1997-2005, the incidents rate] … for
international staff was almost three times greater [than for local
staff.] But pressures to go to the worst places are growing. …
[An expert] says aid workers now routinely enter areas they would once
have avoided …
‘All too often, aid workers are in the front lines, in places where
most governments won’t even send their own militaries.’” “Doing evil to do-gooders – Aid workers”, The Economist, 20 January 2007. [See also Rod
Nordland, “The war on the rescuers”, Newsweek, January 29, 2007, pp. 24-27.]
315a. “Has North Korean leader Kim
Jong Il subverted the United Nations Development Program… the U.N.’s main
development arm, and possibly stolen tens of millions of dollars of hard
currency in the process? … And just as disturbingly, the U.N.
aid agency bureaucracy has kept the scamming a secret since at least
1999 … Nothing was disclosed even to the UNDP Executive
Board. … Moreover, the period of scandal and secrecy …
coincided … [largely] with the tenure of Mark Malloch Brown, … [who took
over the UNDP in July 1999, then became Kofi Annan’s chief of staff and
subsequently UN Deputy Secretary-General in late 2005 and then 2006.] …
… In a letter … on January 16, Mark Wallace, [a U.S.
ambassador at the U.N.], … [wrote that] the [UNDP] auditors, contracted
from the consulting firm KPMG, [could only make limited investigations] …
or accept ‘sham’ audits done by the North Koreans themselves. The picture …,
according to Wallace, shows a U.N. agency that ‘operated in blatant
violation of U.N. rules.’ … Wallace called for a ‘full independent and outside forensic
audit’ of UNDP’s programs in
North Korea, going back to at least 1998 … ” George Russell, “U.S. State Department reveals North
Korea’s misues of U.N. Development Program funds and operations”,
Fox News, January 19, 2007.
315b.
“UNDP’s lack of oversight of its operations in North Korea is
revealed in previously undisclosed documents and an exchange of letters …
American officials have been pushing for months for more transparency …
while the UNDP has resisted. … Unlike Oil for Food, there’s no evidence to date that
corrupt UNDP officials are in on the game – though … [this awaits] a full
investigation.
…
[However, UNDP did] let myriad rules be broken and … [did not]
bring these irregularities to the attention of its governing body. …. There is little if any oversight of the UNDP’s
projects in North Korea … It’s anyone’s guess as to whether … [that work]
is benefiting the people for whom it is intended. … [A UNDP spokesman] says his agency’s
operations in North Korea ‘fully comply’ with the decisions of the
executive board.
…. The U.S. … [and other governments] plan to request a
‘deferral’ of the agency’s programs in North Korea until a full accounting
of its operations can be made. An independent, outside audit is an
essential first step … and don’t stop at the UNDP. The North Korean
operations of other U.N. agencies … also deserve scrutiny.” Melanie Kirkpatrick, “United Nations dictators
program”, The Wall Street
Journal, 19 January 2007.
315c. “As the UN’s Oil for Food
disgrace rolls on, … a new dollars-for-dictators scandal [in North Korea]
is breaking into the open. … Why let a little U.N. corruption, or incompetence,
interfere with serious diplomacy? Well, … we still don’t know how wide or
deep this scandal is … any cash to [North Korea] contradicts U.N. and U.S.
policy … [and there is] the matter of the U.N.’s own credibility … [The UN
could have quickly responded to U.S. queries, but UNDP actions] …
certainly seem reminiscent of the early U.N. stonewalling on Oil for
Food. One lesson of Oil for Food, and its failure to lead to
any serious reform, is that to some foreign policy elites there can be no
such thing as a U.N. ‘scandal.’ That’s because for them the U.N. is all
about good intentions, … rather than about actual results. But it is
precisely that forbearance that has … brought Turtle Bay to its current
low ebb.
Getting to the bottom of Cash for Kim is one more chance to make
the U.N. shape up …” “UN cash for Kim”, The Wall Street
Journal, 19 January 2007. [Note:
for the concurrent UN Oil for Food developments, see items 313a. through
313e. above.]
315d. “In an effort to silence
critics, ,,, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has ordered an independent
external audit of system-wide activities of the world body. The exercise,
which could take months, would be carried out by all UN agencies, funds
and programmes, UN officials said but gave no deadline for its
completion. The announcement came as the [UNDP] announced it would
stop paying hard currency for its operations in North Korea following
reports that Pyongyang might be diverting the money … to its nuclear
weapons programme.] An official said his agency will seek an
independent external audit of the programme … The Security Council had
imposed sanctions on North Korea in October last year following its
claimed nuclear test. … Subcontracting of national staff via Government
recruitment will also be discontinued. Monitoring and audit systems will be put
in place ‘addressing the issue of national execution.’ … [Asked] why UNDP, which has recently
stated its commitment to transparency, does not make all of its audits
available to Member States – as does the UN Secretariat – [the official]
said the issue was under discussion.” Dharam Shourie, “Ban orders independent external audit
of United Nations activities”, newkerala.com (India), January 20,
2007.
[Note: See also item item 263 in Overview Quotes
IV on UNDP’s own self-praised, but nonfunctional,
“Information Disclosure Policy”.] 315e. “What a difference a weekend
makes.
On
Friday, … Ban Ki-moon reacted to the breaking scandal at the
[UNDP] by calling for an ‘urgent, system wide and external inquiry into all
activities around the globe by the UN funds and programmes.’ By Monday [it] … had been
scaled back to North Korea, and … [aspects of projects there.] Sources … wondered who got to Ban Ki-moon [for the
dramatic cutback.] Some cite …[the top UNDP twosome of Kemal Dervis and Ad
Melkert] … and Bruce Jenks of UNDP’s “Bureau of Resources and Strategic
Partnerships”, [who] knows where the bodies are buried in UNDP’s system of
400-plus trust funds. … Some … are also reaching conclusions on Ban. They point
[for example] to his lack of action [on DESA mismanagement] … Others argue
that while the old guard was able to rein Ban in on Monday, this will not
go on forever.
Time will tell. Ban Ki-moon ‘has also requested the administrator of
UNDP to provide information in detail concerning the corrective actions
taken in response to the internal audit findings of 1999, 2001, and 2004.
… What actions? And unlike in the past, will the answers be made
public?” Matthew Russell Lee, “Ban Ki-moon narrows scope of
UNDP Inquiry …”, Inner City
Press, January 22, 2007. [Note: the
DESA situation referred to is described further in items 297a, b, and c of
Overview Quotes
V.]
One, of May 2006 … [is very damning in its detailed
deficiencies, but the manager concerned was promoted to a higher level
post.]
… [A manager who received a bad audit for deficient
management and widespread control weaknesses, including an unreliable
Atlas data system] was put in charge of auditing other country
offices.
… This Atlas system was described as one of Mark
Malloch Brown’s crowning achievements at UNDP and its satellites … But
repeatedly the audits show the system not working or not being used … This is the fragmentation and world of UN fiefdoms …
[which Ban Ki-moon planned to review] on Jan. 19 and then offered a
reprieve on Jan. 22 … The UNFPA audits were … never sufficiently
disclosed, and rarely if ever acted on. … … Problems at … [such other UN funds also] … are
systematic and require full public review and disclosure, and then
substantive action.” Mathew Russell Lee, “At UNFPA, audit failures are put
in charge of audits …”, Inner City
Press, January 23, 2007.
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