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UN Performance Problems UN Management Accountability Struggles Where is the Rule of Law? Inadequate UN Oversight Recent Developments
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This IO Watch website first
went fully online in May 2005.
Its objective is to present and analyze, as representative of
international organizations overall, a detailed record of UN management
accountability, transparency, and performance reform attempts and problems
dating back more than half-a-century, but concentrated in particular on
General Assembly reform efforts since 1986. The IO Watch archive contains
some 160 integrated subsections, each based on quote excerpts proceeding
chronologically. IO Watch
assumed that UN reform actions had always proceeded so slowly that this
structure could be kept up to date fairly steadily. Events almost immediately
proved this optimism wrong. A clear "tipping point" was reached in May
2005 when the UN Secretariat was forced to publicly admit that "the most obvious shortcomings identified
by the Volcker Inquiry and other crises are in the area of oversight and
accountability", and that UN management control systems were inadequate
and must be significantly enhanced. The pressures accelerated in May 2006
when the General Assembly bluntly called on Secretary-General Annan to
present clear accountability mechanisms and to rigorously enforce
accountability at all levels, without
exception. The
elements of the UN accountability breakdown since a self-proclaimed "annus
horribilis" in 2004 are many.
They include the very critical Iraq oil-for-food programme reports,
refugee sexual abuse, staff mistrust of UN senior officials, a broken-down
human rights commission, grave staff security mismanagement in the field,
Security Council reform breakdown, scandals in the internal oversight (and
anti-corruption) agency, a major and high-level sexual harassment
case, troubles with a massive
tsunami relief effort, embarrassing actions (or inaction) by senior
Secretariat officials, and -- most recently -- major scandals in UN multi-billion
dollar procurement operations, much dissatisfaction with the management of
UN peacekeeping operations, and pending efforts to drastically revise UN
staff rules and staffing patterns.
Keeping
track of all this sudden UN operational turbulence and media attention is
obviously difficult. IO
Watch, for its part, has annual expenditures which are almost exactly
$9.252 billion less than the $9.252 billion UN budget for 2005, and it
also has exactly 40,074 less full-time staff than the 40,074 full-time
staff that the UN had as of June 2005, that is,
none. IO
Watch is therefore shifting its priority from updating its 160-some
archive subsections to tracking the many recent many new articles, books,
and documents on UN management accountability and performance issues on a
month-by-month basis (see "Overview … Quotes" at the bottom of this home
page). Updates for the rest
of the website will be done if and when possible, with emphasis given to
such pressing UN operational issues as management accountability,
management reform, anti-corruption strategies, oversight, transparency,
governance, further oil-for-food and
tsunami relief fallout, whistle-blowers, internal justice reform,
senior managers' impunity, refugee sexual abuse, procurement, and
peacekeeping operations. This
subsection presents one additional IO Watch feature. The weak UN management culture has
resisted General Assembly pressures for accountability and transparency
mechanisms with great determination for 60 years. The following "black holes" list
distills the key findings of the extensive IO Watch archives and the new
Overview quotes into a few summary narrative pages each for six key
non-accountability elements that are firmly, and very destructively,
embedded in UN operations. Each section ends with achievable corrective
actions, and detailed references to the relevant IO Watch archive
subsections and recent (mid-2005 ff.) Overview Quotes. This "black holes" material will
be updated occasionally in the future as events (tangible actions, not UN
verbal promises, new untested policies, or posturing)
dictate. *
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The concept of "black holes"
has many negative characteristics and connotations in various areas of
life (as presented in a "disambiguation page" at wikipedia, the free
online encyclopedia): "-- A black hole, in physics, is an
object with sufficient density that the force of gravity prevents anything
from escaping from it except through quantum tunneling
behavior. -- A black hole, in
programmer's jargon, is a pipe which feeds into Unix's dev/null, a place
of permanent oblivion for data also known as the bit
bucket. -- A black hole, in computer
networking, refers to a place where traffic is silently
discarded. -- In social or business
conversation, a black hole is any effort which consumes time, energy, or
other resources without yielding a useful result. -- In defense
contracting, a black hole is slang for a work area allegedly hosting a
black project [top secret, unacknowledged]. -- In English contract
law, a black hole refers to the injustice to non-parties to a contract
caused by a strict interpretation of the rules of privity of contract,
whereby parties have suffered no damage, but non-parties to the contract,
despite reliance on the contract to their detriment, have no legal
recourse."
The following six areas, IO
Watch believes, represent six "black holes" with which the UN Secretariat,
its senior officials, and its derelict management culture have
successfully evaded the General Assembly's long-standing efforts to
establish management accountability and transparency. These black hole efforts include
(as suggested by the definitions above): -- burying or suppressing
management problems, -- ignoring or sabotaging
General Assembly instructions, -- using Secretariat
resources and energy for mere "window-dressing" reform activities,
-- undertaking instead senior
officials' own unpublicized efforts to ensure self-preservation,
-- and, above all, dealing with
important legal, fiduciary, and moral obligations in ways that are
quite detrimental to the interests of the world's taxpayers, and the many
people worldwide who rely on timely and effective UN emergency
programmes and services.
If the UN is ever to overcome
its recent public relations. performance, and oversight disasters, the General Assembly,
Member States, a growing number of concerned NGO's, and publics must
persevere to make sure that the Secretariat finally takes firm action to
counter and eliminate these enormously destructive black
holes.
Whistle-blowers?
What
whistle-blowers?
Opacity and dissembling, not transparency "Free the
[incompetent] UN
managers" "Independent" UN oversight is not UN senior officials remain comfortably outside the law
UN
senior officials remain comfortably outside the law II
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