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Archive Introduction

Black Holes 2                 

Whistle-blowers?    What whistle-blowers?

As discussed in Black Holes 1, the UN's cover-up of corruption has been hard to maintain, despite the Secretariat's continual and determined efforts.  The General Assembly's persistent emphasis on management accountability; ongoing (and recently expanding) UN corruption problems; extensive media coverage (especially in the Internet age); and increasing global recognition of corruption and its pervasive and damaging effects have all kept the issue alive.

In contrast, the Secretariat's effort to cover up UN whistle-blowing, and whistle-blowers, has been an almost total success.  From the time that the General Assembly specifically called for encouraging and firmly protecting them in 1994 -- despite strong Secretariat objections -- whistleblowers were simply kept invisible until an "Integrity Survey" of UN staff suddenly revived the issue in 2004 and a major UN procurement scandal appeared in 2005.

As discussed under "Corruption cover-up", the General Assembly pressed hard at the end of the 1980s for more accountability and strengthened internal controls and audit.  It also called for a confidential mechanism for staff to report misconduct (hereinafter referred to as whistle-blowing).  The Secretariat argued that whistle-blower efforts worldwide were patchy, staff could not be protected, and there would be burdensome due process and fairness difficulties.  It then concluded that the existing rules could handle misconduct.  However, after new reports on major flaws in UN anti-corruption efforts in 1993, the General Assembly called for new "transparent and effective" management accountability processes by January 1995.  In 2004 it also established what became the unified Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), with a new investigations unit to, inter alia, receive confidential whistle-blower reports.

The Assembly's push for such whistle-blowing processes was, in fact, in tune with worldwide developments  as shown by three expert quotes in 2001-2002 and a 2004 quote from a worldwide survey on global anti-fraud trends:   

"As the international community is increasingly recognizing, employees (especially public employees) are an invaluable source of information about official corruption.  … Whistleblower protection laws are intended to make it safe for employees to disclose misconduct that they discover during the course of their employment. ….

Statutory protection for whistleblowers is only part of the equation, albeit an important part.  Cultural change and top down support must accompany whistleblower protection laws in order for them to achieve their objectives."

"Even when … systemic requirements [for fighting corruption] are well satisfied on paper, they will not be effective unless enforced.  Fully effective enforcement requires:

?         an independent and competent judiciary

?         adequate prosecutorial capabilities

?         whistle blower protections …"

"Reporting misconduct by public servants is either required by law and/or facilitated by organizational rules in two-thirds of OECD countries.  A growing need to protect whistleblowers in the public service is also visible across OECD countries. … the most commonly provided safeguards are legal protection and anonymity."

"What works [to combat corruption]

FACTOR       RANK

Internal controls            1 

Whistle-blowing            2

Internal audit                3

Management review      4

Accident                      5

External audit               6"

The new UN whistle-blower system was actually launched with an excellent set of policies, procedures, and protections.  The detailed guidance is still readily available: please see the following documents at the OIOS website, www.un.org/depts./oios, under "About us", "Mandate":

-- the 1994 General Assembly resolution establishing the OIOS specifically requested the Secretary-General to ensure confidential reporting and protection for staff reporting misconduct, and called on him to include these procedures in the UN staff rules  (at "48/218 B", paras. 6-7);

-- an official Secretary-General's Bulletin in 1994 detailed whistle-blower procedures and protections, including staff rights, confidentiality, fairness, and due process (at "ST/SGB/273", para. 18)  ;

--  an administrative instruction of 1994 encouraged UN staff to submit reports of negligence or rule violations, and then a 1996 information bulletin elaborated on investigations of "mismanagement, misconduct, waste of resources, and abuse of authority" with careful definitions of misconduct and unsatisfactory performance (at "ST/AI/397" and "ST/IC/1996/29"). 

Despite this very promising policy start, however, the actual UN whistle-blowing process stumbled severely.  The first head of the OIOS, Mr. Karl-Theodor Pashke, was "curiously laid back", initially contemptuous of anonymous reports (until reminded it was his job to protect such reporting), and decided that "fraud was not the main concern of the OIOS."  He subsequently had to deny to a General Assembly committee in 1996 that he would ever discriminate against a whistle-blower [although he did], and media articles reported doubts about his commitment to "fraud fighting" and whistle-blower protection.  The five observations below capture the considerable, long-standing staff skepticism that exists on this topic:

"Any staff member who criticizes his boss on the record has destroyed his UN career prospects."   (A senior UN official in the late 1980s, informally advising a diplomat at a UN mission)

"No senior UN official will ever be punished unless he is caught with his hand flagrantly in the financial cookie jar, or in an abusive sexual act,  and even then only if those actions have appeared in, or might appear in, the press"   (A veteran UN administrative insider in New York in the mid-1990s)

"Time and time again, when journalists have exposed scandals in the UN, senior officials have set up an enquiry -- into who leaked!"  (A long-time observer of UN operations and culture, in 1995)

 "There are whispers that senior staff need not fear their peccadilloes will be exposed.  "Paschke's Finest", it is said, will rake no muck above a certain level of political or bureaucratic influence."  (A news article, in 1996)

"UN employees -- who request anonymity because they fear they will suffer more professional harm than the corrupt officials they want to expose -- have provided numerous accounts of officials' being transferred rather than dismissed after being caught breaking the rules.

This happens frequently in cases of sexual harassment, nepotism, and occasionally violence, according to these accounts.  Whistle-blowers are neither encouraged nor rewarded."     (A news article, in late 1997)

The new OIOS investigations unit was equally weak, starting work very slowly and remaining consistently understaffed. Further, its whistle-blowing work disappeared, because the unit never reported on the results and accomplishments. Signs, however, were discouraging.  The unit piled up a very large backlog of such reports; dismissed many of them out-of-hand at "personal matters" which it casually passed on to the personnel office to "deal with"; judged that many others provided "insufficient evidence"; suggested that staff go instead to the UN's very inept "internal justice" system; or, worst of all, sent some reports back to the staff members' units as "internal matters" for the managers to "handle."  Many staff also knew of friends who submitted serious whistle-blower reports, but never received any response.   

After a splashy media report on "an unprecedented wave of [UN] waste, fraud, and  corruption" in 2000 and 22 cases were sent to national courts for criminal prosecution, even details on general OIOS investigative activities suddenly evaporated.  IO Watch has analyzed the OIOS reports of the past dozen years.  It found no reports of a whistle-blower who succeeded, no one recognized for his or her efforts, and only one report on a possible case of retaliation against a whistle-blower.  There were also no statistics on whistle-blower reports and results overall. 

In contrast, in 1998 Mr. Paschke highlighted a manager whom OIOS vindicated of serious misconduct as a "valuable service" of the OIOS, i.e., protecting individuals who have been wrongly accused (the whistle-blower concerned was fired.). Thereafter, even Mr. Paschke, and his successor Mr. Dileep Nair, fell silent on whistle-blowing matters, while the UN top leadership, including Mr. Annan, seem never, ever to have mentioned the issue during that first decade.

However, two significant events did occur in the late 1990s. First, the UN had had an excellent code of staff conduct, emphasizing both rights and duties, since 1954.  In 1998, however, it was updated and replaced with a new Code of Conduct.  The new code was very strong on staff obligations and very weak on staff rights and due process. It also totally ignored the strong 1994 rights and protections for whistle-blowers established by the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, but did include a firm instruction to staff to cooperate fully with "staff members and other officials" investigating corruption and misconduct. This gradually came to include not only OIOS professionals, but UN managers, UN security guards, and assorted others (see Black Holes 4 on "Free the [incompetent] managers" for more on these "Inspector Clouseaus.")

Second, the General Assembly did not give up on whistle-blowing issues, at least until after the new millennium arrived.  It expressed continuing strong concern about fraud and a lack of sanctions for managerial misconduct. In 1999 it debated a very unusual draft resolution that "encouraged" the Secretary-General to ensure that UN auditors were promptly protected from any reprisals, and in 2000 it formally stressed that the Secretary-General should protect the rights of whistle-blowers -- both clear signs that the Assembly realized that something was very wrong behind the scenes.

UN whistle-blowing then disappeared for several years, only to return with a bang in mid-2004.  A survey of staff integrity produced surprisingly negative comments on UN leadership and the management culture, also tied directly to the issue of whistle-blowing.  The following four quotes show the general tenor of the survey results, specific attitudes toward whistle-blowing, the (first-ever) thoughts of Secretary-General Annan on whistle-blowing and the survey results, and a sharp assessment by an expert observer of the Secretariat leadership games being played.

"A new survey  of  … [UN integrity]  has found that while structures for reporting and combatting  corruption exist, most staff members are either unaware of how to use them or afraid to do so for  fear of  high-level retaliation.

… Its most negative findings have to do with ingrown leadership and the lack of response to reports of corruption.

'Get rid of the old boy network,' one staff member … [says.]  'That network is wide, tenacious and powerful.  … So long as you can wind your way into that network, you are OK. … Opposing the network is certainly the end of a UN career.'"

"[The Integrity Survey report states]

Provide a Safe Milieu

Staff members feel unprotected from reprisals for reporting violations of the codes of conduct.  This is not a perception confined to a few staff in remote locales and/or dangerous circumstances.  Forty-six percent (46%) gave unfavourable response to this item, while only 12% gave favourable responses.  The causes of this perception have at least two sources: experience and/or mistrust." 

"[Secretary-General Annan stated that] Staff voice concern about the consequences of 'whistle-blowing' or reporting on misconduct, and uncertainty about the mechanisms for such reporting. …  We will inform all staff about the means available to them for reporting on suspected misconduct.  We will also develop measures to reinforce formal protection for whistle-blowers, while ensuring that they are not used to cloak false accusations."

"Having [found] … that Secretariat staff don't trust the top management and are afraid to speak out for fear of reprisals, Mr. Annan's response will be to convene a group of top managers and invite staff members to speak out. …

Does anyone see a problem here?

The basic flaws are simple: Anytime you create a large institution, accord it great privileges of secrecy, give it a big budget and have it run immune from any sane standard of accountability, you are likely to get a corrupt organization.

… The problem with the Secretariat isn't 'tone' at the top.  It's accountability at the top and secrecy throughout. … "

In March 2005, a strange new UN staff circular said that staff could report suspected misconduct to senior managers, OIOS, the personnel office, the Ombudsman, the Staff Counselor, the Panel of Counsel, the Focal Point for Women, and staff groups (it did not mention cashiers in the UN cafeterias.)  In August 2005, the Secretary-General proudly announced that the OIOS was assisting in drafting the UN's "first whistle-blower protection policy", (ignoring the General Assembly's excellent 1994 policy available to anyone on the OIOS website.) Mr. Annan also announced that a new Ethics Office would handle reports of reprisals against staff whistle-blowers and witnesses. The UN's new top manager stated in late 2005 that the UN did not have a functioning whistle-blower policy, but would now "foster a new UN culture," and in January 2006 he repeatedly praised the "courageous" UN whistle-blowers who were coming forward in a burgeoning UN procurement scandal.  In early 2006 the UN also issued its new anti-retaliation policy for whistle-blower protection, which was highly praised.  IO Watch will try to keep up with all these new cross currents, as and when they sort themselves out.

Meanwhile, the oil-for-food scandal investigations, and the passage of time, were finally bringing out stories of staff severely punished for whistle-blowing.  Because so much is hidden, IO Watch offers a "chain" of quotes on whistle-blowing instances since 2002, (see Overview Quotes in the "Interested in more details?" text box at the end of this subsection.)  However, three instances in 2004-2005 testify to the severe damage done to UN staff who tried to act with integrity on matters of corruption and misconduct within the Organization.

"[In 1997 three UN staff became whistle-blowers reporting corruption at the UN war crimes tribunal in Rwanda. …

They all lost their jobs, unfairly, because they complained … [even though OIOS investigated and issued a damning report.] …

Sirois … was unemployed for four years as he tried to clear his name. …  Lacoste left Arusha shattered and dismayed.  She … had lost four years' income.  [Goddard] …  was initially out of work for nine months … and said his reputation as a chartered accountant [had] been damaged.

 … All three of these highly qualified people who tried to right wrongs only to lose faith in the U.N. justice system now praise the [UN] Administrative Tribunal for its handling of their cases in the end.  But why did it have to take so long and at such terrible human neglect all the way to the top?  And will they ever be repaid for their losses?"

"Two lawyers for U.N. whistle-blowers urged the United Nations on Wednesday to protect staffers who want to disclose corruption at the world body, including the oil-for-food program for Iraq.

One of the lawyers said 'five or six' U.N. employees including a high-level employee had contacted him for advice on how to reveal evidence of wrongdoing in [that] … programme without jeopardizing their careers. …

But based on his advice, none of [them] … have gone public, he said.  'I know them. They won't.  They are very quiet and under a lot of stress.' …

While U.N. rules call for wrongdoers to be punished, they do nothing to shield staff members from reprisals when they come forward with evidence … [the lawyers]said.

'There is irreparable harm when freedom of speech is canceled, irreparable harm to the institution,' [one] said.  'The message is, 'Do not say anything to investigators.'"

"The United Nations … has its own ways of dealing with whistle-blowers.  Mostly, it fires them. … And although a supervisor's retaliation for whistle-blowing is officially prohibited under U.N. rules, enforcement comes only in the form of penalties against the offending supervisor [Note: if at all] -- not job reinstatement for the whistle-blower. …

Recent whistle-blowers interviewed by the National Journal suffered [the loss of their jobs.] …

Would-be U.N. whistle-blowers are on perilous ground, as they have no legal right to defend themselves.  'All they can do is complain and say the bully should be punished' said Tom Devine, legal director of the Government Accountability Project … The United Nations, Devine says, provides staff with fewer rights to defend themselves than 'any other government agency I've encountered, either on the national or the international level."

*       *        *        *

In sum, the UN Secretariat has, for once, delivered on a performance promise, but in this case a negative one.  It argued in 1992 that a confidential whistle-blowing arrangement would not work in the UN, and so far it has made that dire prediction come true.  Even after the Integrity Survey results and the procurement scandals revived the issue in 2004-2005, the new Secretariat whistle-blower policy, however excellent, is still only words.  There is much unfinished business that must be addressed both to clean up the UN's whistle-blowing process and the surrounding pervasive and hostile culture.

IO Watch knows of many UN staff who suffered under the post-1994 Secretariat failure to properly implement w-blower reporting and to protect them for reporting misconduct in good faith. It believes that whistle-blowing (as the rest of the world knows, but not the UN) is a critically important way of combating corruption in an organization.

Regrettably, however, the poor UN management culture remains very strong, despite the promised revival of UN whistle-blower protection policy in 2006, and whistle-blower protection is always an inherently challenging process to implement.  Therefore IO Watch would caution would-be UN whistle-blowers to think twice about sticking their necks out and jeopardizing their careers, until there are clear signs that the following critical areas are being corrected.

1.             The "Group of 18" recommendations in 1986, which kicked off the "modern era" of UN management reforms, emphasized that efficient UN staff management must rest on clear, coherent and transparent rules and regulations, with special responsibility for a healthy work climate resting on every manager and, above all, with senior managers.  When it comes to whistle-blowing rules, however, Secretary-General Annan and his senior managers selectively promulgated the rules in 1998, and have never corrected them. 

In 1999 the UN replaced its old code of conduct with a new one. However, the General Assembly and staff were concerned at the draft code's heavy-handed emphasis on obligations, lack of emphasis on managers' higher responsibilities and level of accountability, and limited consultation on its contents as it was pushed through to approval and issuance.  The new code itself included a new regulation which Mr. Annan and his legal office proceeded to ignore, namely his own specific duty to ensure that staff rights, not just duties, are respected: